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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article seeks to integrate different strains of knowledge and
enlightenment from contradictory and often contentious jurisprudential
perspectives. Our approach is to use elements of modem jurisprudence
as tools and markers for a more adequate description and intellectual
justification of the foundations of modem human rights law. This focus
integrates existing literature that surveys law-making outside the context
of the State, including the law of non-State groups, such as Jewish Law
and Gypsy Law. It also examines the relevance of communications
theory to law generated (in a functional sense) by individual interaction
on a face-to-face basis (which Professor Harold Lasswell' has identified
1. Harold Lasswell was co-founder of the New Haven School of International Law and the
sub-discipline known as the Policy Sciences. He was Ford Foundation Professor of Law and
Social Science at Yale Law School. His important public positions included the presidency of
both the American Society of International Law and the American Political Science Association.
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as the micro-social level, and is thus known as "micro-law"), small
group law, and international law (which Lasswell has identified as the
macro level, and is thus known as "macro-law"). Indeed, the
communication of human rights perspectives and operations channeled
by signs and symbols are a part of the more general theory of human
communications. Communications theory-used either implicitly or
explicitly-is a tool to which diverse jurists and legal scholars have
continually returned to authoritatively explore human connectivity. This
Article explores the implications of a more explicit use of modem
communications theory to give focus and orientation to the
anthropomorphic foundations of human rights law.
Lasswell was the first to realistically delineate a global process of
communication. His groundbreaking approach to the study of
communication adds previously unascertained depth to contemporary
understandings of how power operates in society and the State. Indeed,
this approach presupposes an understanding of the social process of
communication. This insight has significantly broader implications; it is
an accurate commentary on the way that the State figures into the
context of international relations. 2 Accordingly, the global community
might accurately be viewed, in Lasswell's nomenclature, as a global
"manifold of events."3 Lasswell theorized extensively about this
"manifold," or continuum, on which, he argued, all political variables
are interconnected by reference points. This Article suggests that those
reference points are linked despite their various trajectories (vertical or
horizontal, global, or local) by human communication. In moving along
the continuum (which is thoroughly explored later in this Article) from
local to intermediate structures of authority and control, and back to the
local context, the ultimate unit of social process of communication is
apparent: it is the individual self system.
Lasswell's communications theory resurrects the central dynamism
of the concepts of community and social interaction. The individual is
thus a critical component of the realistic study of power and society. It
therefore becomes clear that in the national or global environment, the
2. See HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS 240-67 (1930).
3. Lasswell's notion of the State as a "manifold of events" was based on his concept of
political communications. We believe that his groundbreaking theory permits an inevitable
expansion, which would include the idea that the global community is a component of a
communications event manifold, which moves from the individual and the local to society, to the
State, and to the global community and its social processes. The key conceptual and descriptive
linkage is a deeper theory of the social processes of communication itself See LASSWELL, supra
note 2.
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individual is the critical focus of both description and normative
analysis. This insight-an important conceptual breakthrough for social
theory and law-permits the rational inquirer to identify, both
empirically and normatively, the centrality of the individual in
accounting for the rights and obligations of the individual in the national
and global environment.
This Article submits that Lasswell's communications theory and its
explanation of reference points and their divergent trajectories as events
in State and global social process is based ultimately on the individual
human being as the triggering mechanism of politically and legally
relevant communication. It further submits that recognizing that the
individual is central to law and politics, as well as to communication
and decision, and understanding that the individual to be a responsible,
rights-bearing, political and legal actor provides critical insight into the
foundation of international human rights law. This Article explores
these concepts and linkages more fully to strengthen the understanding
and relevance of international human rights law. To conduct a coherent
study, the necessary knowledge integration must include many
trajectories of communication, which function as conceptual maps of
jurisprudential discourse. These maps have heuristic value because they
guide the development of a more effective and accurate theory of
human rights.4 The conceptual map associated with micro-law-the
theory which applies to so-called micro-social situations, such as
individual relationships and interactions-is one that has great
implications for the study of human rights. This Article in part seeks to
integrate these strands in the application of communications theory
4. A principal orientation which guides inquiry into human rights is stated in the configurative
jurisprudence of Lasswell and McDougal. The conceptual map or orientation is summarized as
follows:
1. the identification of the scholar or observer in relation too the events being
observed, with specification of his standpoint and purposes;
2. the delineation of relevant foci for inquiry, with location of the particular events
being subjected to inquiry in the larger context of events with which they interact;
3. the postulation and explicit disclosure of the comprehensive goal values assumed
in, or sought to be served by, inquiry;
4. the specification of a range of intellectual tasks pertinent to inquiry about any
aspect of social process, including: clarification of goals, description of trends, analysis
of conditions, projection of future developments, and invention and evaluation of
alternatives; and
5. the development of dependable and economic procedures for performing the
intellectual tasks regarded as relevant.
See 1 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY:
STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 3-4 (1992).
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within a broad framework of jurisprudential orientation and clarify the
concept of human rights and its foundations in legal theory and practice.
Human rights is a field that has the unusual distinction of being
simultaneously affirmed rhetorically, avoided in practice, and often left
under-explored in theory. Many human rights law practitioners are
particularly impatient with theory; they thus avoid it because they do
not see its importance in paradigmatic terms.5 However, theory is
crucial because it generates sustainable institutions and expectations
about rights and obligations, which are critical to even the most
elemental ideas of justice and decency. Legal theory might be used as
an epistemological tool of inquiry to explore a deeper sociology of
human relations, as well as to generate and improve the articulation and
understanding of basic moral commitments. Each successive, close
analysis of what law is and how it operates brings the participants in the
continuing discourse ever closer to one of the most universal of human
priorities: a comprehensive understanding of how to best identify,
promote, and defend fundamental human interests.
This Article seeks to integrate concepts from a variety of disciplines,
including diverse schools of legal theory, and to explore the foundation
of what counts as law, with particular regard to international human
rights law in terms of Harold Lasswell's phenomenology and theory of
communication. Part II examines the origins of international human
rights law and the critical importance of theory to notionally introduce
the significance of communications theory to the international human
rights regime. Part III examines the way in which conventional
jurisprudence has reconstructed contemporary ideas of what comprises a
State, including the notional basis of State absolutism and sovereignty.
It further examines the key insights of Harold Lasswell, the architect of
a revolutionary approach to communications theory, and takes his
communications model a step further to demonstrate that the same
network of communication that binds the individual to the State and the
State to the individual vests each individual with human rights. Part IV
5. Fundamental precepts of human rights law have been seemingly avoided--or obviously
ignored-by various respected legal scholars, which is usually predicated on convenience or
special circumstances. See J.S. Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development
of Human Rights Norms in International Law, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 609 (stating that many
international law scholars ignore blatant human rights violations perpetrated by States); Eric
Lane, Mass Killing by Governments: Lawful in the World Legal Order?, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 239 (1979) (arguing that some human rights proponents misunderstand the true nature and
purpose of international law); see also LORD DENNING, THE FAMILY STORY 240 (1981)
("Jurisprudence was too abstract a subject for my liking. [It is] [a]ll about ideologies, legal norms
and basic norms, 'ought' and 'is,' realism and behaviorism: and goodness knows what else.").
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then explores the further development of communications theory, its
influence on the development of law (particularly international law and
human rights), and international politics through the lens of Lasswell's
groundbreaking identification of the law of micro-social interaction, or
"micro-law." Part V examines the application of communications theory
to the process of lawmaking in international law. Finally, Part VI offers
crucial future implications of how micro-law will continue to influence
the process of lawmaking in the global context.
II. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
THE CROSSROADS OF THEORY AND STATE PRACTICE
Human rights norms became a fixture in the political and juridical
landscape of Western Europe in the years following World War II. The
distinctive jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, for
instance, provides palpable evidence of this postwar transformation.6
6. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) (determining that
extraditing a criminal suspect sought by U.S. authorities to the United States would constitute
"inhuman treatment," a direct violation of Article 3 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, if that criminal suspect were to face the
death penalty, and finding that this criminal suspect might be sentenced to death, and thus face
the "death row phenomenon"-the process of waiting on death row for years prior to being
executed; because of this, extradition would constitute a human rights violation). The ECHR
generally remarked on the ubiquitous tension between national interest and human rights when it
stated: "[Ijnherent in the whole of the [European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms] is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general
interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental
rights." Id. at 89; see also Streletz v. Germany, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. (2001) (unanimously
confirming the treatment of German Democratic Republic (GDR) leaders with regard to their
official orders that people trying to escape the GDR be killed and deciding that a retroactive
application of criminal laws was without merit, based on the international law principle, nullum
crimen sine lege ("no penalty without a law") which, stated otherwise, requires than an individual
cannot be penalized for engaging in acts that are not prohibited by law); Lopez Ostra v. Spain,
303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) (holding that a town's governing body failed to sufficiently
moderate its pollution levels violated the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms because the governing body's conduct violated the rights had
by the town's citizenry-specifically, the right to respect for one's private and family life); Funke
v. France, 256-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993) (recognizing the significance of the right of the
accused to remain silent to avoid self incrimination); Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1993) (overturning the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness, Mr. Kokkinakis, who was
arrested and convicted under Greece's anti-proselytism law); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1988) (holding similar to Dudgeon v. United Kingdom); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,
45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981) (disapproving of British legislation that outlawed sodomy); Airey
v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979) (overturning a decision by the highest court of Ireland
that denied the appellant, Mrs. Airey, a woman who lacked sufficient resources to hire an attorney
to defend her interests, access to a free attorney); Ireland v. United Kingdom 25 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1978) (raising the standard for permissible interrogations).
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Human rights law thus became a conventional part of European law,
and European constitutional systems were consequently much
transformed. Positivist pronouncements made way for inalienable
demonstrations of respect for human dignity. Hence, the theory and
doctrine of human rights jurisprudence havc provided a firm juridical
foundation for the making and application of human rights law in the
European context.7  The European approach was a constructive
beginning to the continuing, problematic, theoretical, and foundational
aspects of human rights.
In South Africa, the policies and practices of apartheid were thought
to be the complete antithesis of international law, international human
rights law, and indeed the international rule of law itself.8 From these
centralized, positivist institutions of control came a dramatic process of
political and juridical transformation, and the world witnessed a new
South African constitutional order firmly grounded in contemporary
international law perspectives. 9 The movements in South Africa of
7. An example of the way in which international human rights law regimes have been adopted
and applied in the sovereign rule of law dictates of individual European nations has occurred in
the United Kingdom. Three British solders (members of the Queen's Lancashire Regiment
participating in the 2003 war in Iraq) have been charged with committing war crimes following
the death of an Iraqi detainee. The three soldiers allegedly beat and kicked nine Iraqi civilians in
September 2003 during the course of a security operation in Basra, Iraq. One of these detainees, a
hotel receptionist named Baha Musa, died from his injuries while in British custody. Under the
International Criminal Court (ICC) Act of 2001, the actions allegedly perpetrated by the British
soldiers constitute "inhuman treatment" of civilians, behavior which the Geneva Conventions
categorize as a "war crime." No British soldier has ever been formally charged with a war crime
before and if the three are convicted, they each face up to 30 years in jail. See Editorial, UK
Soldiers Face War Crimes Trial, BBC NEWS, July 20, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/
hi/uk/4698251 .stm.
8. See generally Winston P. Nagan, An Appraisal of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of
1986, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 327 (1987) (providing an authoritative gloss on South Africa's apartheid
regime and its incompatibility with international law and human rights norms); see also RICHARD
L. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID, 1980-1994
(1995); DAN O'MEARA, FORTY LOST YEARS: THE APARTHEID STATE AND THE POLITICS OF THE
NATIONAL PARTY, 1948-1994 (1997); Winston P. Nagan, South Africa in Transition: Human
Rights, Ethnicity and Law in the 1990s, 35 VILL. L. REV. 1139 (1990); Winston P. Nagan, Law
and Post-Apartheid South Africa, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 399 (1989).
9. The South African Constitution states:
When interpreting the Bill of Rights [of the Republic of South Africa], a court, tribunal
or forum must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom; must consider international law; and may
consider foreign law. When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence
of any other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law,
customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 39, available at http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/
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opposition and the civil society generated an articulate, informal,
evolving bill of rights arguably inaugurated by the African National
Congress' Petition of Right during World War II, and later by the
Freedom Charter, which was adopted by the People's Congress in
Kliptown in 1958.10 In short, human rights' perspectives were becoming
the living law of South Africa's liberation movement. These non-State
informal perspectives deeply influenced the new South African
Constitution, which virtually codified the International Bill of Human
Rights as conventional constitutional law."1 These developments may be
contrasted with what occurred in Southeast Europe, 12 Rwanda,1 3 and
1996/96cons2.htm#39 (emphasis added); see also S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 14, § 232, available
at http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/96cons 14.htm#232 (Customary
International Law); S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 14, § 233, available at http://www.info.gov.za/
documents/constitution/1996/96cons14.htm#233 (Application of International Law). Other
sections of the South African Constitution reflect international law standards relating to civil and
political rights. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 9 (Equality); S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2,
§ 10 (Human Dignity); S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 11 (Life); S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 12
(Freedom and Security of Person).
10. See generally RAYMOND SUTTNER & JEREMY CRONIN, 30 YEARS OF THE FREEDOM
CHARTER 1-103 (1986) (tracing the origins of the Freedom Charter and examining its continuing
relevance to human rights and social justice).
11. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 14, § 232; see also S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 14, § 233.
12. In 1991, the ethnically diverse and formerly peaceful Balkans rapidly descended into
State-induced brutal warfare and State-sanctioned ethnic cleansing campaigns which resulted in
the killings of thousands of people. Groups in the region fractured along ethnic and religious lines
because of a series of tactical decisions made by governing elites:
[Former President of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Milosevic and
[former Croatian President] Tudjman held a meeting in March 1991.. .on the partition of
Bosnia-Hercegovina between Croatia and Serbia, leaving the Bosniacs, who comprised
the largest ethnic group in the country, with little territory. Under this scheme, a Greater
Croatia and a Greater Serbia would be carved out of what was formerly known as
Bosnia-Hercegovina. [The result of this meeting of government elites was that] [i]n
Bosnia-Hercegovina alone millions of people were displaced by the fighting.... UN
soldiers... [dealt] with the aftermath of massacres in which bodies of men, women and
children would be found either shot, stabbed with knives, or in some cases burnt alive.
ALASTAIR FINLAN, THE COLLAPSE OF YUGOSLAVIA 1991-99 35-37 (2004); see Winston P.
Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty, International Criminal Law and the Ad
Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 127 (1995); see also
Winston P. Nagan, Towards Unpacking the War in Forner Yugoslavia: An International
Lawyer's Perspective, 10 HuM. PEACE 3 (1994) (regarding the IOAES Commission on the Study
of Peace at the University of Florida in Gainesville, Florida); Winston P. Nagan, Rethinking
Bosnia and Herzegovina 's Right of Self Defence: A Comment, 52 INT'L COMMISSION JURISTS 34
(1994).
13. Upon the political independence of Rwanda in 1962, ethnic Hutus enjoyed Rwanda's seat
of power even through 1990 when the ethnic Tutsi-dominated RPF (Rwandese Patriotic Front)
launched coordinated attacks on the oppressive ethnic Hutu military government, which
responded by declaring a series of "norpoM" or "pogroms"-the State encouragement of the
wreaking of unreserved havoc-until the Arusha accords brought about a mutual cease-fire. See
BRUCE D. JONES, PEACEMAKING IN RWANDA: THE DYNAMICS OF FAILURE 1, 38 (2001). The
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later in countries such as Sudan 14 and Zimbabwe.' 5 As mentioned
assassination of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana in April 1994 swiftly ended the cease-
fire; it was the event which the ethnic Hum government employed to spark the Rwandan
Genocide of between 800,000 and one million ethnic Tutsis and Hum moderates between April
and July of 1994 at the hands of Hum authorities, military forces, militia, and even ordinary
Rwandan men and women. See PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH To INFORM You THAT
TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998). This
genocide has been described as "planned, coordinated, directed, [and] controlled." JONES, supra,
at 39. The State-encouraged genocide was largely implemented with rudimentary weapons,
knives, sticks, and panga and "[s]ome were shot or killed by grenades. Most were chopped to
death with machetes, knives, or farm hoes. Others were thrown down pit latrines, or wells, or
were bound and tossed into rivers or down ravines or even buried alive." Robert F. Van Lierop,
Mission Report, Rwanda Evaluation: Report and Recommendations, 31 INT'L LAW. 887, 892
(1997).
14. The violence in the Darfur region of the western Sudan is rooted in a lasting and violent
conflict between nomadic ethnic Arab livestock herders and ethnic African farmers. The violence
intensified in 2003 when two organized groups in Sudan, the Justice and Equality Movement and
the Sudan Liberation Movement, each initiated an independent armed rebellion against the
Sudanese Government; the power base in each group individually chose to rebel against the
Sudanese government to combat their perceived exclusion from recent national negotiations
regarding the distribution of wealth and political power in Sudan. The Khartoum-based Sudanese
government violently responded to the groups, particularly in its increased direct and indirect
geographically localized support for ethnic Arab militias called thejinjaweid, which perpetrated
extensive human rights violations first against ethnic non-Arab rebels and then against the larger
ethnic African civilian population, rebels or not. See GERARD PRUNIER, DARFUR: THE
AMBIGUOUS GENOCIDE (2005); see also Sudan Peace Act § 2, Pub. L. No. 107-245, 116 Stat.
1504 (2002) (concluding that the government of Sudan had committed genocide). The Sudan
Peace Act further directed the U.S. Secretary of State to extensively monitor the Darfur Conflict
and to gather comprehensive information on any incidents of genocide, war crimes, or other
human rights violations that transpired in Sudan. See § 11. The result was a report delivered on
September 9, 2004, by former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee regarding what is commonly referred to as the "Darfur Conflict." Former
Secretary Powell remarked on the findings of the State Department's extensive information-
gathering efforts, which found: "A consistent and widespread pattern of atrocities (killings, rapes,
burning of villages) committed by jinjaweid and government forces against non-Arab villagers;
Three-fourths (74%) of those interviewed reported that the Sudanese military forces were
involved in the attacks; [and] Villages often experienced multiple attacks over a prolonged period
before they were destroyed by burning, shelling or bombing, making it impossible for villagers to
return." Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Written Remarks Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee: The Crisis in Darfur (Sept. 9, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/
secretary/former/powell/remarks/36032.htm. Former Secretary Powell continued his remarks:
"When we reviewed the evidence compiled by our team, along with other information available
to the State Department, we concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the
Government of Sudan and the jinjaweid bear responsibility-and genocide may still be
occurring." Id.; see also H.R. Con. Res. 467, 108th Cong. (2004) (enacted) (declaring genocide in
Darfur).
15. Robert Mugabe has occupied the Zimbabwean seat of power as President since 1987. See
U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Zimbabwe, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/
5479.htm (last visited March 16, 2007). Various government actions designed by Mugabe
resulted in an economic crisis in Zimbabwe in 1997, which intensified for years thereafter. In
February 2000, calls for Mugabe to step aside as leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union-
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above, under the cover of State sovereignty, governing elites have acted
without restraint, particularly against domestic populations.
Accordingly, in different ways, these contemporary examples of abuse
Patriotic Front increased in both scope and intensity. Mugabe responded by referring back to what
may have been the most delicate, sensitive, and precarious political issue in Zimbabwe to distract
the public: the confiscation and distribution of farmland owned by white Zimbabweans. See
David Blair, Pressure Mounts for Mugabe To Quit Party Post, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
Feb. 18, 2000, at 20. Mugabe quickly had the constitution of Zimbabwe amended to permit his
governing regime to strip white Zimbabweans of their farmland without compensation. See Anton
La Guardia, Vote Gives Mugabe a Free Rein To Seize White Farmer's Land, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Apr. 7, 2000. By levying public threats against landowning Zimbabwean whites and
ostensibly promising to redistribute this land to his supporters, Mugabe won the general election
of June 2000 by a slim margin. See Anton La Guardia & David Blair, Mugabe Still Plans To
Grab White Farms: Unity Call After Narrow Election Win, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June
28, 2000. By the early 2000s, white Zimbabweans numbered less than fifty thousand,
approximately four thousand of whom were farmers. See U.S. Department of State, Background
Note: Zimbabwe, supra. Mugabe continued to threaten white farmers with great harm and his
rhetoric gained in its wrathful intensity. See, e.g., David Blair, Mugabe Warns Farmers of
'Severe' Violence, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 30, 2000, at 19. See also Anton La
Guardia and David Blair, 'White Farmers are our Enemy': Mugabe Inflames Hatred as Second
Zimbabwe Landowner is Killed by Invaders, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 19, 2000.
Mugabe began to refer to white Zimbabwean farmers as "enemies of the state [of Zimbabwe]."
Id. Mugabe further charged that peace in Zimbabwe was being subverted by "some white persons
of British extraction who have been planted in our midst to undertake acts of sabotage aimed at
affecting the loyalty not just of people in general but also that of the vital arms of Government
like the army, so that these can turn against the legitimate Government of this country." See
MARTIN MEREDITH, OUR VOTES, OUR GUNS: ROBERT MUGABE AND THE TRAGEDY OF
ZIMBABWE 154 (2002). By the beginning of 2001, Mugabe's government had confiscated over
one thousand farms owned by white Zimbabweans and promised that the remaining land held by
white Zimbabweans would soon be taken as well. See David Blair, Mugabe Told To Halt Land
Grab or Face Isolation, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 7, 2001, at 24. This confiscation had
largely reached its end by the close of 2002. Strong links exist between groups perpetrating
violence against white Zimbabwean farmers and Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe's
government, such as mass deaths, government-sponsored rapes, and widespread kidnapping of
white Zimbabwean farmers, female relatives, and individuals in favor of democratic reform in
Zimbabwe. See MARTIN MEREDITH, MUGABE: POWER AND PLUNDER IN ZIMBABWE 167-70
(2002); see also Peta Thornycroft, Rape Gangs Targeting Whites in Zimbabwe, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 2, 2004, at 17; Michael Wines, Reports of Rape and Torture Inside
Zimbabwean Militia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2003, at 3. It has been suggested that the actions of
Mugabe's government, when taken in conjunction with the (at least) extremely violent and (at
worst) arguably genocidal acts of groups affiliated with Mugabe's government, collectively
approach the definition of genocide. See, e.g., Gregory H. Stanton, Genocides, Politicides, and
Other Mass Murder Since 1945, with Stages in 2006, GENOCIDE WATCH, 2006,
http://www.genocidewatch.org/about genocide/genpolmmchart.htm. It is perhaps arguable that
Mugabe's continued rhetoric, which urged violence and suspicion of white Zimbabweans,
contravened the Genocide Convention to which Zimbabwe is bound as both a signatory and
ratifying State, because he "deliberately inflict[ed] on the group [of white Zimbabwean
landowners] conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part." See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2(c), Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
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are at least implicitly supported by a jurisprudential theory of
sovereignty, which is often self-servingly construed as strengthening
claims to State absolutism. ' 6 The central point, we would submit, is that
theory influences perspectives, and perspectives in turn influence
identifications, demands, and expectations about human rights, State
sovereignty, and the scope of international obligation.
Theory deeply influences practice. It is indeed critical to the
comprehension of problems to which law must respond, particularly in
the context of human rights abuses. Such comprehension is also a vital
element of law-motivated action and intervention, which is critical to
the culture of human rights. In the world of human rights, the
inadequacies of theory may contribute to the depreciation of human
dignity. There is much contemporary truth in Moses Moskowitz's
insight that:
[I]nternational human rights is still waiting for its theoretician to
systematize the thoughts and speculations on the subject and to
define desirable goals. Intelligent truisms do not necessarily add
up to a theory. No one has yet arisen to draw together into a
positive synthesis the facts and fancies which emerge daily from
events of bewildering complexity and to carry on an authentic
debate. International concern with human rights is still very
much a theme begging for a writer. And the scholar has not yet
appeared to redress the distortions through a calm and systematic
application of facts, to ground abstractions in the specific, and to
define the limits of discourse.17
Outside of the specialists in government, the world of human rights is
populated by practitioners who consistently engage in the practical work
of investigation, coordination, and active interventions.' 
8
Overwhelmingly, the most effective of these human rights investigators,
practitioners, and activists function on a full-time basis, though they
16. See Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of Sovereignty in
International Law and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 141, 171-78 (2004)
(exploring State typologies which manifest abuses of sovereignty).
17. See MOSES MOSKOWITZ, THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 98 (1968).
18. Various investigatory bodies have been charged with or have assumed the charge of
searching for perpetrators of human rights violations throughout the world, from UN Special
Rapporteurs and a unit of special investigators under the directorship of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights to non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch. See generally STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS,
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE
NUREMBERG LEGACY (2d ed. 2001) (comprehensively appraising twentieth century investigative
and prosecutorial efforts to hold individuals accountable for human rights atrocities).
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often coordinate their work with a volunteer universe of actors. 9 This
world is characterized by inevitable ambiguity in decision-making
regarding international pressure to intervene in particular human rights
crises, which is applied by academics who largely cannot carry an
institutional base of sufficient effective strength in the public arena.
20
However, this does not mean that academics cannot in some anecdotal
way, practically intervene in complex human rights situations and do
some good.2 Academics have long been adept at both helping to create
19. See, e.g., YVES BEIGBEDER, THE ROLE OF AND STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN VOLUNTEERS AND ORGANIZATIONS: THE RIGHT AND DUTY TO HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE (1991); MARVIN E. FRANKEL & ELLEN SAIDEMAN, OUT OF THE SHADOWS OF
NIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1989) (discussing generally the
impact of work by non-governmental human rights organizations on the international human
rights climate, and acknowledging that the success of such NGO work is due in part to a
significant international volunteer base); HENRY J. STEINER, DIVERSE PARTNERS: NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1991); Laurie S.
Wiseberg, Protecting Human Rights Activists and NGOs: What More Can be Done?, 13 HUM.
RTS. Q. 525 (1991); see also HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 456-99 (1996); Felix Ermacora, Non-Governmental Organizations as
Promoters of Human Rights, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 171
(Franz Matscher & Herbert Petzold eds., 1990).
20. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2001) ("Much of the historical analysis of humanitarian
intervention suffers from a lack of precision as to what that term embraces."). Chesterman
suggests that significant tension exists between opposing sides of the humanitarian intervention
dialogue-the result of a continuing scholastic conflict between proponents of so-called "just
wars" and adherents to non-interventionist philosophies based on various geopolitical concepts,
such as sovereignty, legal positivism, etc. Id. at 7.
21. Pro-interventionist scholarly arguments are generally predicated on the supposition that
most transnational crises are at least partly attributable to the absence of normative legal
guidelines in certain parts of the world, such as vacuums where international law, functional and
effective domestic governance, and outside assistance from State and non-State support regimes
should exist. Indeed, these pro-interventionists perceive a continuing demand for humanitarian
action-in different forms-by the international community. See Thomas G. Weiss, On the Brink
of a New Era? Humanitarian Interventions, 1991-94, in BEYOND TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING
3, 15 (Donald C.F. Daniel & Bradd C. Hayes eds., 1995). Such action might include: peace-
keeping, the provision of sustenance to starving parts of the developing world, efforts at
democratization, or peace-building initiatives-depending on the context of the challenge in
question:
[I]n light of genocide, misery, and massive human rights abuses in war zones around the
world, should Pontius Pilate be the model for... the international response? The fatalism
and isolationism that flow from most objections to humanitarian intervention are as
distressing as the situation in the countries suffering from ethnic conflict where such an
action is required... [because a] purely noninterventionist position amounts to abstention
from the foreign policy debate.
Id. at 15; see also World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Report of the World
Conference on Human Rights, pt. II., para. 24, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.157/24 (Oct. 13, 1993)
(promoting intervention as part of the Conference, where "all States [are called upon] to take
immediate measures, individually and collectively, to combat the practice of ethnic cleansing to
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a coherent framework within which to ground a culture of human rights
law, as well as raising contextual pressure for practical intervention
when human rights deprivation reaches levels of moral depravity that
are quite simply sickening.
22
Thus, despite what amounts to a series of contemporary human rights
constitutional guarantees throughout the world-indeed, human rights is
widely recognized as an inextricable part of international law-in
practice, human rights is typically mandated up to a fairly flexible point.
By removing the human rights discussion from the generally mandatory
and placing it in the contextually specific, perhaps progress might be
made on more fronts. This is because a contextual discussion might
better permit the identification and reconciliation of what is ostensibly
exclusive and personal, and what is inclusive and internationally
relevant. It may thus be of value to engage in a more adequate
exploration of general human rights problems from a communications-
oriented, theoretical, and foundational point of view.23 More than that, it
may be that in these everyday--or micro-social-interactions that we
begin to see the critical role of subjective perspectives,24 which emerge
from the human agents who constitute the basic unit of society. These
bring it quickly to an end"). Pro-interventionists come in various shapes and sizes, and advance
an array of ostensible justifications to promote certain interventions. See, e.g., ANTHONY C.
AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN
CHARTER PARADIGM 191-92 (1993) ("[J]ustice is valued above peace. States are claiming the
right to use force to promote certain 'just' goals... [yet] different groups of states have offered
differing and often contradictory definitions of what a 'just' goal is... [and thus] there is a
consensus that it is proper to use [interventionist] force to promote democratic self-determination
in the western sense of the term.").
22. Various scholars employ different criteria to arrive at different justifications for certain
forms of intervention. Many agree, however, that egregious human rights violations necessitate
some form of international action. See MORTON H. HALPERIN & DAVID J. SCHEFFER WITH
PATRICIA L. SMALL, SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 62 (1992) ("[T]he legal
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states is beginning to be eclipsed in Europe
by a commitment to promote democratic pluralism, human rights, and fundamental freedoms.");
Vladimir Kartashkin, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 202, 208-09 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds.,
1991) (arguing that only the UN Security Council-as opposed to individual nation-States-has
the legal authority to sanction a humanitarian intervention into a sovereign State).
23. See infra Part IV.
24. Since micro-law must per force deal with individual human subjectivity, the inevitable
concern is that it will introduce excessive subjectivity and instability when it informs the
foundations of human rights. This concern is misplaced because it ignores sophisticated methods
developed to measure human subjectivity. The key methodology was inspired by William
Stephenson and has more recently been developed by Steven Brown. See Steven R. Brown, A
Primer on Q Methodology, 16(3/4) OPERANT SUBJECTIVITY 91 (1993); William Stephenson,
Perspectives in Psychology: XXVI. Consciousness Out-Subjectivity In, 18 PSYCHOL. REC. 499-
501 (1968).
738 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 47:3
micro-social relationships might bring additional, significant
perspectives to the human rights debate, which lend support to the
foundations of respect and essential dignity. Indeed, by studying these
relationships, further insight into the true source of human rights law
might be garnered. In short, communications theory may well disclose
that human rights does not fit in the conventional, hierarchical,
jurisprudential mold because it is a norm-generating enterprise that
originates and operates from the bottom-up.
One important reason for scholastic emphasis on the jurisprudential
foundations of human rights is that this field is identified with currently
unfashionable "natural law. ' 25 Conventional legal theory in the form of
either analytical positivism or the distinctively utilitarian version of
pragmatic jurisprudence has tended to be skeptical about the possibility
of human rights as a juridical construct.26 Jeremy Bentham, the
25. Natural law claims that legal conditions and principles derive from good and proper
human order in both widespread and individual conduct. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 152 (1961) ("[T]he Thomist tradition of Natural Law... comprises a twofold contention:
first, that there are certain principles of true morality or justice, discoverable by human reason
without the aid of revelation even though they have a divine origin; secondly, that man-made
laws which conflict with these principles are not valid law."). The intellectual underpinnings of
natural law rest on the argument that analytical jurisprudence can otherwise "have no critically
justified criteria for the formation of general concepts." See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS 18 (1980). It has been argued that human rights in particular is endowed with
natural law content because these fights are inherent in humanity and not brought into being by
States or legal norms. See RICHARD A. FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT 116 (1986). Perhaps
best declared in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, natural law embodies various
theoretical perspectives, from Rousseau's notions of social contract, to Locke's philosophy of
human autonomy from the State. See Jerome J. Shestack, The Jurisprudence of Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 69, 85-99 (Theodor
Meron ed., 1984) (exploring an assortment of theoretical perspectives associated with both
natural law and human rights); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (detailing
the Rawlsian approach to justice, which identifies a natural law basis for human rights by
balancing precepts of liberty and human equality). Claims that morality is rooted in human
biology, which have more recently been expounded by such commentators as Francis Fukuyama,
Charles Murray, and James Q. Wilson, have long encountered heavy criticism. See, e.g., ROBERT
H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 66 (1990);
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REv. 40,40 (1918) ("[Natural law comprises]
the jurist's search for criteria of universal validity.").
26. It is important to note that there are different versions of the policy discourse in the
universe of theoretical elaboration, although some versions of policy-directed pragmatism may
indeed provide excuses for exploitation, or human deprivations of basic human rights and respect.
See Winston P. Nagan, Professor Langbein and Social Investing: A Comment, 4 HUM. RTS. ANN.
81 (1986); see also LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY, supra note
4, (discussing law as an instrument of policy and a matter of problem-solving, which should have
the goal of furthering human dignity). Rectifying this problem does not call for the rejection of all
forms of pragmatism in law. A pragmatic, policy-oriented approach is an important starting point
to eradicate these human deprivations. The central element of this policy-oriented approach is its
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grandfather of utilitarianism, described natural law as "nonsense upon
stilts. ' 27 More recently, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia,
assuming the natural law implications of human rights in international
law, described the application of international human rights norms in
the domestic American jurisprudential context as "nonsense upon
stilts. '2
8
Skepticism that accompanies the orientation of law toward what is
popularly perceived as normal science seeks to radically limit what
actually counts as law.29 Among the first casualties of this skepticism
was international law. Nineteenth century legal positivist John Austin
described international law as "positive morality" rather than what he
referred to as "law properly so-called." His imperative theory of law
stated that a sovereign could not be bound by an extrinsic legal
obligation since the sovereign was the ultimate source of law. In this
view, international law was not law.30 This and similar skeptical
focus on the many different components of policy thinking-required for effective problem
solving-which yields sophisticated decision-making and is thus an innovative approach to
contextualizing problems and setting out solutions. Accordingly, policy-oriented pragmatism is a
significant advancement of unhelpful forms of popular contemporary legal pragmatism. A
distinctive contribution of the New Haven School is the notion that pragmatism cannot be value-
free; it further postulated that certain fundamental values of a defensible public order may be used
to guide inquiry and intervention. See id.
27. See Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 500,
501 (Russell & Russell 1962) (1843).
28. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 743 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In
Benthamite terms, creating a federal command (federal common law) out of 'international
norms,' and then constructing a cause of action to enforce that command through the purely
jurisdictional grant of the [Alien Tort Statute], is nonsense upon stilts.").
29. The complexities associated with the term, "law" in the study of public international law
and municipal law were carefully analyzed by Glanville Williams in his celebrated essay,
International Law and the Controversy Concerning the Word "Law." See Glanville L. Williams,
International Law and the Controversy Concerning the Word "Law, 22 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146
(1945). Specifically, Williams suggests that meaningful discourse about these two fields of law
would be essentially factual and not verbal. Law may thus be defined by reference to a relevant
context, which might further indicate the limits of verbal communication when employed in an
essentially formal sense to define meaning and discourse. Id. at 163. Hart also insisted that the
word law has meaning in certain largely conceptual contexts, which are meant to be descriptive of
an operating legal system. See H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 L.Q.
REV. 37 (1954). According to the New Haven School, the term, "law," including international
law, derives its meaning from a radical idea of contextuality in terms of social process, be it
domestic or global. See Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and
Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959) (detailing the interplay
between law and power in the context of global politics).
30. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF
THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE, lecture 1, 4 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1954) (1832); see also
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 16, 21-25 (1990); JAVAID
REHMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 15 (2003).
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perspectives about international law deeply influence and limit the
scope of international obligation today; indeed, it has long been a
significant limitation on the inclusion of human rights law as a
component of general international law.31
In the treatise, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, authors
McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen provide a coherent answer to the
Austinian notion that international law is simply positive morality. They
developed a theory about human rights law accounting for the realism
of power in Austin's system, yet providing a more elaborate description
of the authority component, which the Austinian model lacks. In a
sense, they affirm Vattel's postulation that an important distinction must
be made between positive law and what Vattel termed, the "necessary
Law of Nations," which results from cross-applying natural law to
sovereign States. 32 Vattel essentially suggested that the very rules
Austin considered to be positive morality were actually law on a
horizontal plane in the international system. In short, positive morality
was not relegated to juridical irrelevance. What Austin called "positive
morality" is thus a part of the critical normative expectations in the
structure and process of law when it is viewed in terms of process and
decision. In this sense, McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen provide a
disciplined and inter-related, yet distinct set of intellectual tasks that are
critical to human rights decision-making, including: normative analyses
of positive morality and its relevance to human rights decision-making,
insistence on the power of adequate and coherent descriptions of trends,
and the salience of prediction and the creative alternatives in the
31. Some of the United States' greatest jurists have notionally rejected the legitimacy of
international human rights norms. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski
(Oct. 23, 1926), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 887-88 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) ("I
utterly disbelieve all postulates of human rights in general. Those established in a given society
stand on a different ground."). Similarly, Justice Joseph Story, historically an advocate of natural
law, once stated:
No [state] has a right to sit in judgment generally upon the actions of another; at least to
the extent of compelling its adherence to all the principles of justice and humanity in its
domestic concerns.... It would be inconsistent with the equality and sovereignty of
nations, which admit no common superior. No nation has ever yet pretended to be the
custos morum of the whole world; and though abstractedly a particular regulation may
violate the law of nations, it may sometimes, in the case of nations, be a wrong without
a remedy.
United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
32. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN
DIGNITY 341 (1980); see also AUSTIN, supra note 30, at 12; E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW: APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE
AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS 9 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758).
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challenges of making and applying human rights law. Strengthening the
theoretical coherence and justification of human rights theory
effectually strengthens international law. In a broader sense, it
strengthens the foundations of the rule of law concept itself.
This skepticism about international law is built into modem
positivism and the reality of the State as a prime instrument of
governance.33 The identification of law with sovereignty has had a
profound impact on the development of international law and still
commands great influence in the international system; it is obvious that
a theory that defines law in terms of the State will have difficulty in
accounting for law outside of the State. Moreover, a theory that roots all
law in the sovereign State will have difficulty accounting for
circumstances where the State is subject to international law and
international concepts of obligation.34 This difficulty was obvious to
nineteenth century theorists as well as more contemporary figures. 35
33. John Austin perceived law as those commands which emanated from a sovereign.
According to Austin, to interpret a legal system, one must first identify a sovereign (or a person or
organization which habitually obeys no one), whose commands are habitually obeyed. See
AUSTIN, supra note 30, at 199-212. Indeed, analytical positivism teaches us that the practices of
the State's highest law-applying organ are the best indicators of what constitutes the normative
content of the official legal order. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 6 (1970). Cf HART, supra note 25, at 97-
114 (1961) (suggesting that the "rule of recognition" is the primary rule that establishes the
certain parties or organizations as rulemaking institutions).
34. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., 2004) (1967) (examining
generally positivism as a "pure theory of law"); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606-15 (1958); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative
Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983).
35. See GEORGE KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: 1900-1950, at 95 (1984) (criticizing
international law as being insufficiently grounded in reality because of its "legalistic-moralistic
approach" to international disputes); HANS J. MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON,
POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 312 (6th ed. 1985)
(critiquing international organizations, such as the United Nations, as ineffective mechanisms
which seek to displace continuing efforts by various nations to amass power and stating that
"[t]here can be no more primitive and no weaker system of law enforcement than [international
law]"); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of "International Law," 18 NAT'L INT. 3, 4 (1990) (criticizing
the international community's general lack of response to violations of international law);
Michael J. Glennon, The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law, 78
FOREIGN AFF. 2, 4 (1999) (remarking on perceived failures of the UN Charter with regard to
existing measures designed to counter international genocide). See generally AUSTIN, supra note
30; ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPt, POWER AND COMMUNITY (1956); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY
OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979); ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION:
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1962); Reinhold Niebuhr, The Illusion of World
Government, 5 BULL. ATOM. So. 289, 190 (1949); Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and
Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1971 (2004); Kenneth N. Waltz, Reflections on Theory of
International Politics: A Response to My Critics, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 322 (Robert
0. Keohane ed., 1986).
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Indeed, different generations of political commentators and international
law scholars, such as Thomas Erskine Holland and Hersch Lauterpacht,
individually remarked on the ostensible appropriateness of international
law as a branch of law, and conceded that international law was the
vanishing point of jurisprudence. 36 It was generally conceded that
something called international law existed, which was apparently
stripped of a theory to account for it, or indeed to justify it. The
approach is reasonably straightforward: Without the sovereign's
consent, there can be no international obligation. As applied to human
rights, this logic suggests that there can be no human rights other than
those explicitly adopted by the sovereign. Despite its inadequacies, this
statist approach to law sets out an infrastructure of command and
control that many political elites find comprehensible and justifiable.
Sadly, this theory has a legacy of unrestrained State absolutism-a key
factor that underpinned the devastating conflicts of the twentieth
century. Accordingly, for human rights to be firmly grounded in the
current reality of international legal order, it must provide a more
coherent account of its conceptual and normative bases, which are
comprehensible and amenable to rational application in specific
instances.
III. TOWARD UNPACKING CONTEMPORARY EFFORTS To GROUND A
CULTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FROM POSITIVISM TO HUMAN DIGNITY
It is possible to look at human rights as simply a contemporary
expression and codification of the substantive and procedural
foundations of the natural law tradition.37 However, as indicated earlier,
natural law has tended to be unfashionable in an age of strident
secularism where the modem State finds a comfortable fit in the
36. See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 382 ("[I]nternational law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law...."); THOMAS
ERSKINE HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 392 (13th ed. 1924) ("[International
law] is the vanishing point of jurisprudence...."); see also Winston P. Nagan, Lawyer Roles,
Identity, and Professional Responsibility in an Age of Globalism, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 131, 144
(2001).
37. Some fundamental tenets of international law, particularly the law of individual human
rights, derive in part from principles of natural law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. VII, intro, note (1987) (stating that international
law, including human rights law, is "derived from historic conceptions of natural law, as reflected
in the conscience of contemporary mankind and the major cultures and legal systems of the
world").
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philosophy of science known as positivism, and where great controversy
continues to undermine the place of human rights as an important part
of the rule of law in the world community.38 There are contemporary
natural law conceptions of human rights, which are often problematic
because they do not effectively grapple with the reality of the State or
the operational distribution of power within and outside of the State.
The positivist version of human rights provides a weak if not awkward
justification for human rights.39 Sophisticated versions of positivism
concede the scope of international obligation, but still stridently
proclaim the principle that international obligations themselves are only
obligations to which the State consents.40 Even though the influence of
positivism on human rights is reflected in the vast treaty-based regimes
which States must ratify and then adapt into municipal law, the
mechanisms of making human rights law positive meet with many
sovereignty-mandated hurdles.
38. See Louis HENKtN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 5-23, 148-52 (1978) (chronicling how
international human rights law is continuing to develop into what might be referred to as the "new
natural law"). The treatment given to fundamental human rights in the UN Charter is arguably
"supra-positive," and is thus based on natural law. See Theodore C. van Boven, Distinguishing
Criteria of Human Rights, in I THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 43, 53-57
(Karel Vasak ed., 1982); see also Francisco de Vitoria, On the Power of the Church, in
POLITICAL WRITINGS 45, 84 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991) (advancing the
notion that a universal community of nations exists, over which a natural law predominates that is
common to all cultures-also known as a "law of nations" or, ius gentium-and that is a part of a
larger declaration of human rights); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to
Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630 (1957) (offering a natural law alternative to positivism in
the international context).
39. For an analysis of the positivist implications of particular human rights, see Richard A.
Falk, Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 31 (Richard Pierre Claude & Burns H. Westin eds., 2d ed.
1992). Falk suggests that "the protection of human rights...is an outcome of [the] struggle
between oppos[ing] social forces and cannot be understood primarily as an exercise in law-
creation or rational persuasion." Id. at 32. Professor Falk further refers to the typically problem
notion of positivism, where the "positivist idea of sovereignty shield[s] abuses of [human] rights
committed within State territory," as a kind of "statist logic." Id. at 32-33. Falk suggests that such
"statist logic" is actually "[t]he predominant ordering logic since the Peace of Westphalia [which]
has been associated with the 'will' of the territorial sovereign state." Id. at 32. He goes on to
recount that "[t]he government of a State has been its exclusive agent with respect to formulating
its will in external relations. The juridical framework of relations worked out in the West has been
gradually generalized to apply throughout the globe." Id.
40. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PEACE 51 (6th ed. 1963) ("[The legal philosophy of positivism] teaches that international
law is the sum of the rules by which states have consented to be bound, and that nothing can be
law to which they have not consented.").
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A. Harold Lasswell's Reconceptualization of the State and Society
Through the Lens of Communications Theory: The Core
Foundation of Human Rights
This section deals with celebrated political scientist Harold
Lasswell's powerful deconstruction of the State. In 1930, Lasswell
wrote PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS. 41 At that time, the study of
politics was largely a matter of understanding the institutions of
government, yet Lasswell's book took a radically different approach.
Lasswell described the State as a "manifold of events, ' 42 or a
continuum, on which political variables-including the individual and
the State-are interconnected. It might be useful to think of this
continuum and its interconnected variables in the following way:
ational Domestic Interpersonal Intrapsychic Interpersonal Domestic International
tical Political 4 Processes . Processes . Processes 4 Political q Political
esses Processes Processes Processes
Accordingly, actions which originate from one variable ripple out
and affect other variables in both directions on the continuum. The
meaning and significance of this continuum, very crudely expressed
above, is not obvious. But if properly understood, it represents a
significant breakthrough in understanding overarching concepts,
including "the State," "society," "the individual," "the collective," and,
by implication, the notion of an international community-all of which
Lasswell considered to be interacting systems. We contend that the
thread that binds these variables together is communication. It is thus
crucial to recognize that conventional international law moves in one
direction: downward; it seeks to provide for-and thus affect the lives
of-individuals. Lasswell's model, on the other hand, demonstrates that
communication moves from the global level to the local level and back.
Accordingly, while the individual is lost in conventional international
law, the individual is not lost in Lasswell's model.
Communication thus links the individual to the State, and the State to
the individual. The State radiates a peripheral system of nerves of
communication, or government, which either regulate or control all
people who interact within contextual demarcations, such as a territory
or an organized body politic. Of critical importance to Lasswell's model
41. LASSWELL, supra note 2.
42. Id.
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is identifying who controls the central nervous system-who is the
central emitter of a State's authoritative communication?
The growth of industrial civilization led to the expansion of
professional and skilled elites. These elites, funded by the success of
industrial civilization, pioneered many new fields of inquiry, including
important developments in the physical and psychological sciences. The
ascendance of a security elite-the specialist players in the State who
manage war and ostensible security-are silently becoming the central
nervous system of the State. This emerging central nervous system is
thus capable of entirely co-opting the nerve infrastructure of State
power and authority within the body politic or event manifold. Focusing
on communications and on the channels of the transmission of signs and
symbols of authority and control thus provides a compelling insight into
the reality of the body politic and the changing dynamic of its central
nervous system.
Philosophical idealism indicates that the State is sometimes
conceptualized as the embodiment of reason and an unfolding, perhaps
trans-empirical, rationality.43 In this sense, as introduced above, the
discourse about the State preempts the process of conceptualizing it and
indirectly gives the State an unqualified normative justification as a
preferred instrument of authority. The legal effect of such a
characterization suggests that the individual, as well as non-State
groups, are actually objects and not subjects of legal decision-making.
Even if we see the State's population as its empirical constitution, it still
comprises more than the sum of the population's component
characteristics; the State is not seen as a multi-individual phenomenon,
but as a super-individuated phenomenon. Accordingly, the problem
posed by juxtaposing the State and the individual represents an
empirical distortion with disastrous potential; it is how dictatorships are
born. Lasswell maintained that the dualist assumption that the State and
43. Some of history's most notorious minds have articulated, in their Manichean approaches
to political dualism, incredible faith in the rightness of the State (in some cases subject to certain
criteria). See, e.g., GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox
trans., 1952) (1821) (arguing that, to even approach the actualization of freedom, every citizen-
though Hegel likely referred only to males-must participate in various aspects of the life of the
State); KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL, reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 294-442 (Robert
C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (attempting to scientifically establish that the political economy-the
labor movement-is key to the successful operation of the State and its society, by which the
State might solve social problems such as poverty and class division); see also Winston P. Nagan
& Craig Hammer, Commentary: Patriotism, Nationalism, and the War on Terror: A Mild Plea in
Avoidance, 56 FLA. L. REv. 933, 954-55 (2004) (deconstructing unquestioning patriotism in
favor of what might be referred to as "thinking allegiance").
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the individual operate on different levels was fictitious. He viewed this
not as a matter of deep philosophical principle, but rather as a mistake
that is easily corrected by an appropriate investigation of a new
understanding of law, with new tools of investigation using rigorous
methods of observation and analysis.
Lasswell's examination of psychopathology was an early and brave
effort to deal with this theoretically difficult problem-the solution of
which would yield practical knowledge on how our society is organized
and effectively governed in ways that promote security rather than the
conflagration of war and insecurity. In effect, the focus on forces such
as personality, and, indirectly, culture, which constitute the inner reality
of the State, provided deeper insight into the problems of managing the
concentrations of power in the modem State system and particularly the
near monopoly of the State over the instruments and use of violence.44
In exploring the reality of the personality behind the State, Lasswell was
in fact revisiting a powerful distinction establishing a resilient dualism
between the State and the individual, the collective and the self-system,
and the community and the person. This distinction had powerful
normative and cognitive implications.
44. The designation, "the State," is indeed a powerful expression about how society is
organized politically. It is also a convenient political or legal unit of analysis. Since the concept of
State in effect includes a vast reductionism about the dynamic of power and authority and how
these concepts actually work, reductionism is a symbol of convenience and economy of
expression for both theorists and real-world decision-makers. Thus, opinion-making newspapers
could record headlines that simply state, "Great Britain has Declared War on Germany!" A
statement of this kind would silently include expectations for citizens who might face
conscription or other obligations on the part of the State because wars are not fought by political
abstractions, they are fought by individuals-members of the armed forces and the institutions
organized to economically and politically maintain a war effort. Indeed, Lasswell first touched
upon the idea that the State is a manifold of events as he researched the implications of
propaganda during World War I. He posited that the State is not a static body politic; during war,
a State does not manifest the same day-to-day characteristics as it does during a time of peace.
While State infrastructures might appear largely intact, war nevertheless significantly changes a
State. For example, national security values influence or preempt many critical functions of
governmental decision-making. The prime value in the body politic in a war-crisis is security and
survival of the State. See Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security
Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 375, 390-94 (2004). One of the
outcomes of the Great War (World War I) was that the State was transformed from an institution
of security, to one of great insecurity at all levels of social experience. Lasswell connected these
concepts and explored the personal human implications of national and international politics.
After World War I, intellectual responsibility in opinion-influencing circles tended to focus on
such questions as how wars are precipitated, how they are conducted, how they might be
terminated, and what must be done to prevent them. Implicit in these kinds of concerns is the
notion that the State as an actor or unit of analysis obscured matters of decision-making
transparency, responsibility, and an appropriate level of accountability about the agents who act
on behalf of the State. See id.
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Lasswell's overarching argument was that the human personality is at
the center of politics. As a practical demonstration of this phenomenon,
he described how personality dysfunctions in political leaders, including
pathologies, have large scale impacts on political symbols and social
organization, including the waging of war.4 5  Lasswell bucked
convention at a time when the international political climate was
memorably characterized by positivism. In essence, he posited that the
State-ubiquitously heralded as the great allocator of values,
deprivations, violence, security, and insecurity-is in reality a political
abstraction, which obfuscates the true nature of the seat of national
power: an aggregation of personalities in interaction.46
B. Communications Theory and the State as a Manifold of Events
To understand Lasswell's notion that the State and the individual
operate on the same level necessitates observation of the political reality
that the collective (the State) reflects a continuum of events,47 as
mentioned above, which is permeated by reference points that link the
45. See LASSWELL, supra note 2 at 183-93.
46. It is important to note that several international scholars have suggested that there exists
an organic unity between an individual and his/her State. See PHILLIP JESSUP, A MODERN LAW
OF NATIONS 9 (1948). Accordingly, there has long been a State-oriented basis of international
law, such that an individual's legal significance is derived from his/her relationship to a single
State by way of citizenship or nationality. Id. However, the interrelatedness of the world
community has shifted the focus off of the individual and the State, and onto the society of States.
See PHILLIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956). Hence, Jessup coined the phrase
"transnational law," to incorporate "all law which regulates actions or events that transcend
national frontiers." Id. Accordingly, sovereignty is a principle of transnational law. See, e.g., DE
VATTEL, supra note 32.
47. See ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD 83-186 (1931).
Whitehead introduced the notion that events have trajectories in time and space. He posited that
these events emerge and endure in a continuum. Regarding space, Whitehead stated that "duration
is the field for the realised pattern constituting the character of the event." Id. at 183. Whitehead's
concept of endurance requires "a succession of durations, each exhibiting the pattern." Id. The
concept of time in this view is simply a "sheer succession of epochal durations." Id. Whitehead
encapsulated the notional basis of all events which occur in the continuum: A "relationship enters
into the essence of the event; so that, apart from that relationship, the event would not be itself."
Id. at 180. Whitehead also suggests that "the meaning of endurance presupposes a meaning for
the lapse of time within the spatio-temporal continuum." Id. at 175. Regardless of how Whitehead
was technically using these concepts in the discipline of theoretical physics, Lasswell apparently
found these ideas of value in the context of the State and its inner relationships. In other words,
Lasswell articulated that the State manifests relationships with spatial and temporal characteristics
that are linked by the notion of events in time and space. Events in this sense are related to each
other by the concepts of endurance and emergence. These concepts in turn are usefully related to
each other on a time space continuum. Lasswell's use of these ideas to improve our understanding
of the nature of the State, communications theory, and world politics must rank as one of the most
creative recasting and cross-applications of a disciplinary concept in recent history.
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individual to the collective. 48 The multiple trajectories of individuals
and groups are interconnected by these reference points within the
larger event manifold, or continuum, of social process. 49 In other words,
these trajectories come together at certain points on the continuum in
the form of collaboration and integration. From the point of view of the
State, these trajectories are reflected in the principle of territorialism,
which is chiefly attributable to a State's recognition of its individual
spatial dimensions. Social process often yields reference points, or those
events which typically form around human aggregates, such as small
communities or mass populations. Reference points also emerge in
institutional contexts as instruments of organized decision-making (or
governance), which have the competence to manage external structural
threats and opportunities. 50 In this model of the State, it is useful to
think of the event manifold as having a membrane that permits some
permeation as additional group reference points and trajectories
manifest, which in turn influence the political nature of the State.
Issues of control, authority, and decision-making influence the event
manifold by creating ever more fluid and realistic notions of what a
State is and how it is a politically organized, territorially-based body
politic. 51 The dynamism with which Lasswell conducted analyses of the
48. John Rawls subsequently took the position that democratic political culture is the
foundation upon which power is created because it provides the point from which politics-the
mechanism by which power is exercised-is "constructed." Specifically, Rawls suggests that the
language in which politics is carried out is "public reason." He held that "[t]he idea of public
reason.. belongs to a conception of a well ordered constitutional democratic society. The form
and content of this reason... is part of the idea of democracy itself" John Rawls, The Idea of
Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1993). Accordingly, the seat of democratic
power is democratic political culture. Rawls clarifies that the concept of political culture
comprises "[the] fundamental political relation of citizenship [in a democracy that] has two
special features: first, it is a relation of citizens within the basic structure of society, a structure we
enter only by birth and exit only by death; and second, it is a relation of free and equal citizens
who [create and] exercise ultimate political power as a collective body." Id. at 769-70.
49. According to Mark Buchanan, "there can be no more than a few links separating any two
individuals." MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS: SMALL WORLDS AND THE GROUNDBREAKING SCIENCE
OF NETWORKS 197 (2002). Buchanan analyzes terrain explored by Stanley Milgram, and details
the significance of Small Worlds Theory, which posits that all people are to some extent
interconnected on a nexus (or continuum) of social interaction and communication. He states that
"[a] wealth of... evidence points to the likelihood that the small-world property is a general
feature of social networks of all kinds." Id. at 28.
50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201
(1987) (defining a State as an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under
the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal
relations with other such entities).
5 1. John Foster Dulles wrote that global peace and stability "depends most of all upon the
existence of an adequate body of international law." JOHN FOSTER DULLES, WAR OR PEACE 198
(1950). It is within this body of international law where there exists "implicit or explicit
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State as a manifold of events is perhaps well captured in this more
general statement about the problem of observing fluctuating contexts
and presumptions of stability:
Now the whole world of "causation" is implicated in any event,
and the whole number of significant mechanisms which may be
discerned in the "mind at a moment" is infinite. So our
hypothetical volume might conclude by accepting the assumption
that some events can be brought about by more than chance
frequency, subject to the reservation that experimental
confirmation is never reliable as to the future. The critical
configurations may never "reappear." We commonly say that the
probability of an event's future repetition is greater if it has been
oft repeated in the past. But there is no means of demonstrating
that the future contains analogous configurations to the elapsed.
The probability of the future repetition of an event is "no
probability." If events appear to be predictable, this is so because
our knowledge of contingencies is limited, and our sequences of
similar configurations may still be treated as special instances of
"no sequence." The stable is a special case of the unstable, to put
the ultimate paradox.52
In short, for Lasswell, a key outcome of the event manifold is the notion
of causation, which drives State actions, human agency, and the links
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations
converge in a given area of international relations," which might be used to describe the political
organization of a State, and which are intuitively formulated power processes to promote the
common good. See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes
as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). A
contextual map designed to clarify the interrelations of social power and the constitutive process
must perforce account for the notions that constitutional expectations are outcomes of social and
power relations, and that power is an outcome of social interaction. A precise, contextual
appreciation of power must take into account the contextual outcomes of social processes. See
RAYMOND WILLIAMS, MARxISM AND LITERATURE 112 (1977) (arguing that power is constantly
produced by habitual practices that comprise social interactions because it "does not just
passively exist as a form of dominance," because "[i]t has continually to be renewed, recreated,
defended, and modified," and because "[i]t is also continually resisted, limited, altered,
challenged by pressures not at all its own"). The technique of mapping employs a series of
concept markers, which may permit a description of the social and power processes, or any
discreet aspect of them, and may permit levels of generality and particularity, depending upon the
purpose of the inquiry. See Myres S. McDougal, W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard, The
World Community: A Planetary Social Process, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 807 (1988) (holding that
a more realistic conception of world order must incorporate a more comprehensive map of the
global social process from which problems (especially violence) typically emerge).
52. LASSWELL, supra note 2, at 260.
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between them.5 3 Causation (the notional foundation of this manifold)
figures significantly in various disciplines. For example, the proposition
that events are reference points on a continuum is certainly reminiscent
of fundamentals of the physical sciences. 54 It is true that Lasswell was
deeply influenced by Alfred North Whitehead-the metaphysician,
mathematician, and philosopher.55 It might be the case that Lasswell
was very receptive to the emerging signs and symbols of modem
scientific discourse, and that he sought ways to use these forms of
communication to give coherence to his evolving ideas about
personality, culture, science, politics, and legal theory.
How then might one make sense of Lasswell's political sociology of
the State as a manifold of events with individual trajectories? He sought
to develop a conceptual orientation in psychopathology and politics in
part as an outgrowth of his 1927 doctoral dissertation, PROPAGANDA
TECHNIQUE IN THE WORLD WAR.56 In his study of the politics of World
War I, Lasswell observed that signs and symbols were generated in
response to certain events, which communicated very specific messages
to the public, which thus became central to maintaining the war effort.
57
This process was a powerful instrument of communication and social
control, which deftly exploited the symbols of insecurity and heroism,
and effectively pitted "us" against "them. 5 8 Lasswell concluded that the
53. Felix Cohen shared this understanding with Lasswell. Cohen viewed law in social process
terms, the implications of which are fundamentally oriented toward cause and effect in the real
world. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809 (1935). Cohen later explained that his rationale for viewing law through the lens of
human interaction was "because each of us operates in a value-charged field which gives shape
and color to whatever we see." Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J.
238, 242 (1950).
54. The scientific method is founded on the principle of cause-and-effect. See, e.g., John
Lemons, Kristin Shrader-Frechette & Carl Cranor, The Precautionary Principle: Scientific
Uncertainty and Type I and Type II Errors, 2 FOUND. OF SCI. 207, 227 (1997); William Whewell,
On the Nature and Conditions of Inductive Science, in PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: THE
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 66-74 (Joseph J. Kockelmans ed., 1968). Causality figures heavily in
Newtonian mechanics; it is of chief importance to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. See
JEREMY RIFKIN, ENTROPY 33-44 (1980); see also CHARLES KITTEL & HERBERT KROEMER,
THERMAL PHYSICS (2d ed. 1980).
55. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 47.
56. See HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUE IN THE WORLD WAR (1927).
57. These events on the propaganda continuum were indispensable to maintaining the
"modem" war political economy, and were therefore an indispensable part of defending the event
manifold, which in this case was the United States. These signs and symbols were particularly
potent in the guise of mass advertising, which significantly influenced public attitudes toward the
war. See id. at 185-213.
58. See Harold D. Lasswell, The Function of the Propagandist, 38 INT'L J. ETHICS 258
(1928); Harold D. Lasswell, The Theory of Political Propaganda, 21 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 627
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most critical role of these communicative signs and symbols-
propaganda-was the preservation of the manifold (which, in the
context of Lasswell's dissertation, was the United States) from
destruction.
Lasswell recognized that the study of propaganda is a focus of
inquiry with very broad implications for social and psychological theory
and methods of inquiry. 59 The theory and the associated methods and
technologies of propaganda must be explored to precisely understand
how State decision-making processes are radically changing even as the
(1927).
59. See, e.g., FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN, THE SOVIET CULTURAL OFFENSIVE: THE ROLE OF
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY (1960) (discussing Soviet propaganda);
BERNARD R. BERELSON, PAUL F. LAZARSFELD & WILLIAM N. MCPHEE, VOTING: A STUDY OF
OPINION FORMATION IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (1954) (discussing the implications of
propaganda in political processes); J.A.C. BROWN, TECHNIQUES OF PERSUASION: FROM
PROPAGANDA TO BRAINWASHING (1963); JOHN W. BURTON, CONFLICT AND COMMUNICATION:
THE USE OF CONTROLLED COMMUNICATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1969);
COMMUNICATIONS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Lucian W. Pye ed., 1963); KARL W.
DEUTSCH, THE NERVES OF GOVERNMENT: MODELS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND
CONTROL (1963); LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER & DAVID MANNING WHITE, PEOPLE, SOCIETY, AND
MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1964); LEONARD W. DOOB, PUBLIC OPINION AND PROPAGANDA
(1966); LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); LINDLEY FRASER,
PROPAGANDA (1957); ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS: A STUDY OF
INFERENCES MADE FROM NAZI PROPAGANDA IN WORLD WAR 11 (1959); IRVING L. JANIS ET AL.,
PERSONALITY AND PERSUASIBILITY (1959); GARTH S. JOWETT & VICTORIA O'DONNELL,
PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION (3d ed. 1999); ELIHU KATZ & PAUL F. LAZARSFELD, PERSONAL
INFLUENCE: THE PART PLAYED BY PEOPLE IN THE FLOW OF MASS COMMUNICATION (1955);
PETER KENEZ, THE BIRTH OF THE PROPAGANDA STATE: SOVIET METHODS OF MASS
MOBILIZATION, 1917-1929 (1985) (discussing Soviet propaganda); JOSEPH T. KLAPPER, THE
EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION (1960); DANIEL LERNER, PROPAGANDA IN WAR AND
CRISIS: MATERIALS FOR AMERICAN POLICY (1951); JOHN M. MACKENZIE, PROPAGANDA AND
EMPIRE: THE MANIPULATION OF BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION 1880-1960 (1986) (discussing the
role of propaganda in the British empire); L. JOHN MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA: ITS
LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC CONTROL (1958); B.S. MURTY, PROPAGANDA AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT OF COERCION (1968);
HAROLD NICOLSON, DIPLOMACY (Inst. ed., 1988) (discussing the implications of propaganda in
diplomatic processes and international negotiation); ANTHONY R. PRATKANIS & ELLIOT
ARONSON, AGE OF PROPAGANDA: THE EVERYDAY USE AND ABUSE OF PERSUASION (1992);
PROPAGANDA: A PLURALISTIC PERSPECTIVE (Ted J. Smith III ed., 1989); TERENCE H. QUALTER,
OPINION CONTROL IN THE DEMOCRACIES (1985); ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON,
SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS AND UNDERSTANDING: AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
STRUCTURES 36-68 (1977); WILBUR SCHRAMM, MASS MEDIA AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT:
THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1964); RICHARD W. STEELE,
PROPAGANDA IN AN OPEN SOCIETY: THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION AND THE MEDIA, 1933-
1941 (1985); PHILO C. WASBURN, BROADCASTING PROPAGANDA: INTERNATIONAL RADIO
BROADCASTING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL REALITY (1992); JOHN B. WHITTON &
ARTHUR LARSON, PROPAGANDA: TOWARDS DISARMAMENT IN THE WAR OF WORDS (1963);
FREDERICK T.C. YU, MASS PERSUASION IN COMMUNIST CHINA (1964) (discussing Chinese
propaganda).
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State itself maintains the appearance of stability and normality.
Propaganda is best understood with an analysis of the theory and
methods of the social and political processes of communication.
Propaganda is a distinctive communications process. It is maintained
and intensified by operations and practices that control, regulate, or
suppress the critical symbols and signs of manipulated collective affect,
solidarity, and insecurity. This is an important insight into the anatomy
of the State. The larger insight derived from Lasswell's study is that
propaganda is a component of a more ubiquitous process of
communication and collaboration in the interest of the governing elite or
class in the State.
Propaganda clearly targets the individual, for it is designed to
reinforce a psychological sense of who is included in the symbolic
"we," and who is included in the symbolic enemy, the "other." It is
particularly designed to elicit solidarity based on the threat symbolized
by the "other." But how does a threat elicit feelings of solidarity? To be
successful, propaganda communicators had to send simultaneously
complex messages. 60 For example, solidarity is reinforced by idealizing
the symbols of "we" and "us." 61 This is meant to enhance levels of
affect and loyalty to the symbols of authority that need solidarity and
enhanced loyalty (patriotism).62 On the other hand, the enemy must
symbolize a threat-a threat to the sense of personal security. The more
intense the perception of the threat from the enemy, the more personal
insecurity will be produced; the greater the threat perception is from the
"other," or the enemy, the greater the need for security within the "we"
group or nation of primary identification. 63 Lasswell's examination of
the State as a manifold of events thus clarified the trajectories of
propaganda during World War I. His analyses of the wide-ranging
effect and resultant solidarity created by this propaganda definitively
60. French political theorist, Jacques Ellul, suggested that the phenomenon of propaganda is
essentially comprised of four primary qualities. Specifically, propaganda: 1) manifests a focused,
purposeful manipulation of individuals in a society and the society at large: 2) must be far-
reaching to be effective; 3) must be perpetrated in a continuing, lasting fashion through political
power brokering characterized by marked regulation; and 4) must be characterized by
"orthopraxy," or a sense of task-mindedness which leads to a specific goal that is not contingent
on traditional deductive logic. See JACQUES ELLUL, PROPAGANDA: THE FORMATION OF MEN'S
ATTITUDES 9-17 (1965).
61. See CARL COON, ONE PLANET, ONE PEOPLE: BEYOND "US VS. THEM" 30 (2004)
(generally discussing the ethical implications of how a global society develops, functions, and
regulates conflict, and noting that "[t]he 'us versus them' syndrome is an essential element of
[any community]").
62. See Nagan & Hammer, supra note 43.
63. See id. at 943.
[Vol. 47:3
2007] COMMUNICATIONS THEORY AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 753
establish that twentieth century processes of communication telescoped
the boundaries of space and time. For the first time in human history,
the continuum of global events, as portrayed in the content of the
propagandist communication, transcended the individual State and
broadened the manifold to encompass the globe.
The core conceptual basis of the study of propaganda lies in the
communications process. The communications process cuts across all
traditional boundaries of the social and psychological sciences, and
underscores the relevance of approaching inquiry into social process
from an interdisciplinary point of view.64 Lasswell's pioneering work on
communications theory had an important impact on our interpretation
and appreciation of law as a process of communication. 65 Events in each
contextual manifold have meaning and socio-political relevance through
complex channels of communication in social interaction and social
process. As stated above, the modem State, particularly during war and
other crises, generally seeks to control the channels of opinion-forming
communication. 66 Lasswell sought to map the pathological features of
perpetrators of this manner of political undertaking. 67 It was from these
beginnings that the New Haven School of Jurisprudence subsequently
sought to comprehensively map the social process of communication.
C. Extending the Manifold of Events to the World Community: The
Expansion of Communications Theory
One of the great constitutional lawyers of the late nineteenth century,
A.V. Dicey, noted sardonically that jurisprudence (or legal theory)68
64. Professor Lasswell's remarks on the nature of propaganda are both insightful and
memorable. For instance, he stated that "all governments are engaged to some extent in
propaganda as part of their ordinary peace-time functions. They make propaganda on behalf of
diplomatic friends or against diplomatic antagonists, and this is unavoidable." LASSWELL, supra
note 56, at 14.
65. See, e.g., Harold D. Lasswell, The World Revolution of Our Time: A Framework for Basic
Policy Research, in WORLD REVOLUTIONARY ELITES: STUDIES IN COERCIVE IDEOLOGICAL
MOVEMENTS 29 (Harold D. Lasswell & Daniel Lerner eds., 1965).
66. See Harold D. Lasswell, The Function of the Propagandist, 38 INT'L J. ETHICS 258, 267
(1928) ("[T]he propagandist is constrained to think of society as a process of defining and
affirming meaning. His chief preoccupation is with the modes of presentation which redefine
meanings.").
67. See LASSWELL, supra note 2, at 38-64 (analyzing the psychopathological implications of
various types of political actors).
68. RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER, HANS W. BAADE, MIRJAN R. DAMASKA & PETER E.
HERZOG, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXTS-MATERIALS 40 (5th ed. 1988) (stating that the
word "jurisprudence" means "general theory of law," or "legal theory").
754 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
"stinks in the nostrils of the [practitioner]., 69 Apparently, legal theory
was resisted by operative practitioners. The distinguished Federal Judge
Richard Posner-himself an architect of the jurisprudence of political
economy-has suggested that much conventional legal theory is
intellectually worthless y.7 To others however, legal theory is a mode of
inquiry, and a process by which the nature and quality of public order
might be better understood, secured, defended, and promoted in the
common interest.
Legal theory must make rational inquiries about law, particularly
international law and human rights law; it must guide policy
construction as well as the normative clarification of the conceptual
foundations of international legal order. Theory construction is likewise
crucial for providing apposite actors with improved processes of
intervention and appraisal, because when properly understood, theory is
critical for understanding the conditions and future implications of
public order. Accordingly, jurisprudential theory is a key tool of inquiry
into international human rights; to employ this tool we must first
comprehend both historic trends and essentials of theory construction,
which necessarily includes understanding the implications of creating
theories that are consistent with the universal dignity of man. At the
core of this inquiry is the salience of the individual, as well as his or her
relationships with non-self others. This important concept is
extraordinarily demonstrated by the ubuntu principle-the concept of
human dignity as an expression of the crucial goals of African public
order.71 This perspective places the human being at the center of legal
analysis, and advances the notion that the worth of a human being is
expressed by his or her relationships with others. In the words of
Archbishop Desmond Tutu:
A person with ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming
of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good,
for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from
knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is
diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when
69. See A.V. Dicey, The Study of Jurisprudence, 5 L. MAG. & REV. 382 (1880).
70. See e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
71. See S. v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 484A (S. Aft.) (Madala, J., concurring)
("[The ubuntu principle comprises] carries in it the ideas of humaneness, social justice and
fairness."); see also LOVEMORE MBIGI & JENNY MAREE, UBUNTU: THE SPIRIT OF AFRICAN
TRANSFORMATION MANAGEMENT (1995); Mogobe B. Ramose, The Philosophy of Ubuntu and
Ubuntu as a Philosophy, in THE AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY READER 230 (P.H. Coetzee & A.P.J.
Roux eds., 2d ed. 2003).
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others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less
than who they are.72
Indeed, the ubuntu principle is consistent with the emphasis of this
Article that the value of a defensible jurisprudence may be its capacity
to focus on actual human relationships. 73 If the worth of jurisprudence is
gauged by its focus on human relationships and expressed with
precision, it is indeed a powerful tool to protect and sustain human
interests. This human character of jurisprudence is particularly
important to theorists and practitioners dedicated to exploring the
empirical and normative roots of the crown jewel of international law-
human rights.
General communications theory was introduced to the practice of
international law by the New Haven School of Jurisprudence.
74
According to the New Haven School, the social process of
communication is explained in terms of using signs and symbols. This
72. DESMOND MPILO TUTU, No FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 31 (1999).
73. In the Bhe case, (a recent, transformative decision), the Constitutional Court of South
Africa held that male primogeniture-an antiquated rule which exclusively permits male issue to
inherit property of an intestate decedent-is unconstitutional. While the Bhe judgment operates
practically to the tangible advantage of women and children, its theoretical implications are
extremely compelling. The judgment expressly recognizes living law-or in the words of now
Chief Justice Pius Langa, "living customary law"--as authoritative jurisprudence within the legal
system of South Africa. In so doing, the Constitutional Court required South Africa to turn away
from traditional custom in favor of human rights principles. This transformed the Constitution of
South Africa into a vibrant example of the living law. See Bhe & Others v Magistrate,
Khayelitsha & Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (S. Aft.).
74. The initial contribution came in 1966. See Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W.
Michael Reisman, The World Constitutive Process ofAuthoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC.
253 (1966-67) [hereinafter McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process]. A
more explicit analysis of decision functions came about in 1980. See Myres S. McDougal & W.
Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function in World Constitutive Process: How International
Law Is Made, 6 YALE STUD. IN WORLD PUB. ORD. 249, 250 (1980) [hereinafter McDougal &
Reisman, The Prescribing Function]. Next was W. Michael Reisman's lecture for the American
Society of International Law entitled, "International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication,"
a far-reaching piece which implies that effective, competent, international lawyers must employ
all of the important tools of modern communications theory. See W. Michael Reisman, Professor
of Law, Yale Law School, Luncheon Address at the American Society of International Law:
International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication (Apr. 24, 1981), in 75 PROC. AM. SoC'Y
INT'L L. 101, 111 (1981) [hereinafter Reisman, International Lawmaking]. In a separate
contribution years later, Reisman cross-applied aspects of general communications theory to
implicit law associated with everyday social interaction. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN
BRIEF ENCOUNTERS 6, 15, 140, 156-58 (1999) [hereinafter REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF
ENCOUNTERS]. These vital contributions illustrate that participants in the continuing global legal
discourse communicate in ways that are frequently prescriptive, normative, and also supported by
subtle, important cues and behaviors, which are to some extent fundamentally subject to rules and
regulations.
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is because "[s]igns are materials or energies that are specialized to the
task of mediating between the subjective events [(perspectives)] of two
or more persons." 75 Of the signs that are key to human communication,
words are certainly the most ubiquitous, but they are by no means the
penultimate communicative mechanism. Word-signs are invariably
"supplemented by gestures, and by such equivalents as written
characters and pictures.' 76 Symbols are references that give some
degree of meaning to signs. 77 According to Lasswell and his colleagues,
"[t]he subjective events that are called up by the signs of a system of
communication are symbols. In the most generalized sense, symbols are
often referred to as 'interpretations' of signs. 78 While Lasswell and his
colleagues use the term "interpretation" in a legal context, (which is
narrower than the generalized definition of a symbol), they also make
the point that "it is a pertinent step toward objectivity to perceive the
role that a similar though more generalized definition has played in the
75. MYRES S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & JAMES C. MILLER, THE
INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER xii (1967). The idea of rooting
the legal and social processes in the subjectivities of participants might seem counterintuitive
because it conflicts with the jurisprudential assumption that law must ultimately be an objective
enterprise. See, e.g., HEGEL, supra note 43, § 215 ("[Law] must be made universally known.").
Lasswell and McDougal, however, approach the problem of interpretation and subjectivity from a
perspective requiring the realism of subjectivity as an important indicator of human wants and
needs: An interpretation is not normatively justified if it self-consciously seeks to distance itself
from precisely the subjectivities of its essential consumers. The problem of arbitrariness is
avoided and the interpreter is able to cabin discretion by developing articulate principles of
content and procedure to clarify value judgments and to guide interpretation in specific cases
using procedures that are explicit guides to choice. The strategies of communication implicate
familiar ideas as to how the meaning or context of a statement might be interpreted. Lasswell,
McDougal, and Miller suggested that "[s]tatements can be analyzed syntactically and
semantically. In the former case the problem is to disclose the interrelations among statements
when they are viewed as a closed universe.... Semantic analysis, on the other hand, is concerned
with the references found in statements regardless of the location of the referent inside or outside
of the total message." McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & MILLER, supra, at xiv-xv. The functional
explanation of the communications process underlines the importance of a contextual, problem-
oriented, goal-guided, and decision-focused view of law. See RICHARD BANDLER & JOHN
GRINDER, REFRAMING: NEURO-L1NGUISTIC PROGRAMMING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
MEANING 2 (1982) ("In general communication theory there is a basic axiom that a signal only
has meaning in terms of the frame or context in which it appears."). The transmission aspect of
the communication function relates to the expectations about both law and culture conditioned by
recognizing and responding to problems. These ideas collectively comprise the foundation on
which the distinctive, policy-centered jurisprudence for a free society was developed.
76. McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & MILLER, supra note 75, at xiii.
77. See Gordon S. Wood, Intellectual History and the Social Sciences, in NEW DIRECTIONS
IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 27 (John Higham & Paul K. Conkin eds., 1979)
(discussing the general importance of signs and symbols to legal intellectuals and historians).
78. MCDOUGAL, LASSWELL & MILLER, supra note 75, at xii.
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fundamental theory of communication. 79
A key problem for the legal applier or interpreter of law-conditioned
communication primarily deals with the limits of word-based
statements. Since these statements do not exhaust meaning, how is
communication and subsequent interpretation to be done? If a major
purpose of interpretation is to bring communicators to the same
communicative plane, with shared starting points, subjectivities, and
understandings, then words alone are arguably inadequate. Indeed,
relying solely on words may even be irresponsible if the stakes of such
communication are high, or if there lurks an even remote possibility of
misconstrued interpretation in the absence of some additional
communicative mechanism. Accordingly, if textured construction and
interpretation is itself a final version of communication, genuine
expectations and public interest values may be undermined. Indeed,
"[t]extuality stops short with [mere] words." 80 We submit that all
communication must be viewed in terms of the context associated with
the interpreting authority, particularly if this authority is a legal applier
of human rights norms and expectations; it is this interpreter's task to
approach the same shared subjectivities 8" of the parties and the
integration of the communication into more general expectations of the
public interest. This requires a careful and articulate specification of the
protocol governing how such interpretation must occur, as well as a
review of the general goals of public order to further guide specific
interpretative applications.
The foundation of human rights is a matter of critical legal inquiry.
Articulate theory about human rights within the international
constitutional system might provide a more insightful and rational
balance to our understanding of the global constitutional system and its
appropriate rule of law foundations. This Article assumes that one of the
legitimate tasks of academic lawyers in the human rights field is to
provide a coherent theoretical account of the foundations of human
79. Id.
80. Id. at xviii.
81. There is an assumption that subjective behavior cannot be justified by objective criteria,
and that subjectivity accordingly carries a strong element of arbitrariness. This concern is of
critical importance to fields such as moral philosophy and conventional jurisprudence. The
scientific literature dealing with the problem in social and human relations of accounting for the
inter-subjectivities of human beings-and thereby giving these inter-subjectivities a sufficiently
coherent basis for reasoned elaboration-is highly influenced by the work of William
Stephenson, who held doctorates in both physics and psychology. See William Stephenson,
Quantum Theory and Q-Methodology: Fictionalistic and Probabilistic Theories Conjoined, 33
PSYCHOL. REC. 213 (1983).
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rights itself. Such an account must grapple with the challenges
presented by international human rights from the theoretical foundations
of the rule of law itself. Coherent theory is relevant to the practical
development of human rights, which must be culturally based on some
rational model of legal development. 82  A necessary element of
formulating coherent theory regarding the contemporary international
human rights regime is the contextual mapping and interpretation of
relevant communication. Indeed, the tasks of theory and practice are
clear: They must make the culture of human rights an integral part of
the legal culture of both national communities and the larger world
social processes.
83
However, the importance of language cannot be gainsaid. Theorists
and public policy makers have in fact considered the extent to which
language, or more broadly, the signs and symbols of international law,
might be more broadly appropriated in the general fields of international
relations and international diplomacy. 84 Perspectives on the intersection
82. Winston Nagan, co-author of this Article, has long been a proponent of the practical
import of theory, which is far more useful in most all circumstances-of both the academic and
non-academic varieties-than is often appreciated. Professor Nagan heartily disagrees with
Friedrich Engels' assertion that "[a]n ounce of action is worth a ton of theory," JOEL WEISS, THE
QUOTABLE MANAGER: INSPIRATION FOR BUSINESS AND LIFE 200 (2006), unless that theory is
not sound, in which case Professor Nagan has stated, "[bad theory] generally leads to bad
practical results." See HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 89 (Ronald Cohen, Goran
Hyden & Winston P. Nagan eds., 1993).
83. For a cross-disciplinary analysis of how topics in human rights might be more effectively
integrated into national and transnational legal cultures, see 1 C.G. WEERAMANTRY, JUSTICE
WITHOUT FRONTIERS: FURTHERING HUMAN RIGHTS (1997); and 2 C.G. WEERAMANTRY,
JUSTICE WITHOUT FRONTIERS: PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY
(1998). In Judge Weeramantry's first volume, FURTHERING HUMAN RIGHTS, he explores human
rights from both general and specific standpoints. In the section entitled "General Perspectives,"
the Judge generally chronicles human rights issues and gives particular regard to human rights
education. He argues that human rights must be integrated into all disciplines, including
jurisprudence, the geo-political discourse, religious practices and education, world history, the
social sciences, philosophy, the natural sciences, world literature, and more. See I
WEERAMANTRY, supra, at 3. The volume goes on to detail particular human rights issues
requiring immediate global redress, such as international poverty alleviation, sustainable
development, the universal right to be free from torture, the universal right to education, and the
immediate eradication of racism. See 1 WEERAMANTRY, supra, at 171. In the Judge's second
volume, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY, he explores both general
and specific human rights issues in the context of international technological developments. He
addresses the complicated and sometimes problematic link between democracy, science, and the
advancement of human rights in an ever-changing world. The Judge has been an outspoken
proponent of the development implications of technology, and he is a leading critic of destructive
technology, such as nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and other armaments. See 2
WEERAMANTRY, supra.
84. Thomas Erskine Holland sought to create a generalized jurisprudence, which might
function as the foundational grammar of all human legal regimes. See HOLLAND, supra note 36;
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of communication and interpretation are indeed critical to the discourse
about the general nature of law as a means of communication.85 These
insights into the communicative aspects of law-particularly human
rights law-making, application, and enforcement-might deepen our
understanding of law as an instrument to bring about an improved world
order. In this regard, the work of the New Haven School of
Jurisprudence becomes particularly pertinent. 86 Professors Lasswell and
McDougal in particular sought to recast developing ideas in policy-
centered jurisprudence in the direction of a controverted and difficult
international law problem: how is international law actually and
realistically created and applied?87 Scholarly literature has long sought
see also WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL THEORY 26-29 (2000).
85. Lasswell's general theory of communication is applied to the disputed and important area
of international interpretation. His approach importantly corresponds with general principles of
Hermeneutics-the formal study and interpretation of texts, performances, and human events-
particularly with the perspective of JIrgen Habermas. Habermas argued that while law will never
resemble moral truth in terms of its underlying principles and motivation, law nevertheless is
more than the mere illustration of the historical contingency of shared ethical traditions. See
JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY
OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 105 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (1992). He suggested that the
fundamental difference between law and morality was that law binds individuals only in an
external, interpersonal sense, while morality binds individuals internally and externally; law is
thus subject to pragmatic restrictions, particularly in terms of gauging its operational
effectiveness. Id. at 112, 194-230. Essentially, Habermas used modem communications theory to
interpret social events. Understanding was meant to be critical and central to providing a
deconstruction of ideological myth systems. Lasswell's approach to the same problem seems not
to have been as convoluted as its evolution in the German tradition. He cut to the quick as
follows: The political personality is driven by private motives, displaced on public objects, and
rationalized in the public interest. There is no more skeptical or critical concept of ideology in the
literature of law or philosophy. The ideological myth carries no presumption of intrinsic social
worth. Ideology is rationalization, and not a real justification for moral or social worth. See
HAROLD DWIGHT LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY 38, 65-88 (1948).
86. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); 1 ABRAM CHAYES,
THOMAS EHRLICH & ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS
FOR AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE (1968); LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE (1989); THOMAS M.
FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995); FRANCK, supra note 30;
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT
(1994); LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 4; MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL
REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1981); Oran R. Young, International Law and Social Science:
The Contributions ofMyres S. McDougal, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1972); Richard A. Falk, Casting
the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law, 104 YALE. L.J. 1991 (1995) (book
review); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2599
(1997) (essay review).
87. See, e.g., LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 4; McDougal & Reisman, The
Prescribing Function, supra note 74; Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael
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determine how sources of international communication that emanate
from the vast growth of international organizations, as well as domestic
and municipal authorities, might actually count as law.88 Scholars have
thus employed metaphors, such as international "hard" law and "soft"
law, as handy tools to determine what comprises international law.
89
Professor McDougal, together with his colleagues from the New
Haven School, set out the following general model of communications
theory which, when properly contextualized, provides clarity about how
international prescription functions and how to contextually delimit the
legal currency of specific prescriptions:
Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J.
INT'L L. 188 (1968), reprinted in MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 43 (1981); McDOUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 86.
88. For example, and from a technical standpoint, the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights is not a treaty. Does it have any legal force or currency? If it does have some degree of
currency, how can it be coherently assayed? See John P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS
AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 21 (B. G. Ramcharan ed., 1979).
89. Generally, "hard law" is intentionally created to establish lasting, legally binding
obligations, whereas "soft law" is created in steps, beginning with recommendations, which
might-in the fullness of time-be construed as effective ways to interpret international
agreements and custom, or may itself comprise a basis for eventual forms of "hard law." "Soft
law" might also be regarded in terms of what "hard law" is not. Specifically, "soft law" may be
defined as treaties that have not come into force, but which nevertheless manifest some broad
consensus regarding its substance. "Soft law" might also be comprised of provisions from an
otherwise binding international document-such as a treaty-that are hortatory or aspirational. In
short, these provisions indicate that signatories or participants understand that they are obliged to
adhere to the ethical or otherwise political commitments embodied in the provision, even though
the document itself is technically nonbinding at law. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal,
Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 421-22 (2000) (exploring
"hard law" in terms of "legally binding [precise] obligations" and "soft law" in terms of "the
dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation"); see also Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein,
Hard Law v. Soft Law: Unnecessary Dichotomy?, 35 INT'L L. 1433 (2001) (generally exploring
whether a functional difference exists between "hard law" and "soft law"); SOFT LAW IN
GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS (Ulrika M6rth ed., 2004);
C. M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 851-52 (1989); Dinah Shelton, Compliance with International Human
Rights Soft Law, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NON-BINDING ACCORDS 119, 120-27
(Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997); Dinah Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of "Soft Law," in
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM 1, 2-7 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Remarks at the American Society of
International Law Proceedings: A Hard Look at Soft Law (Apr. 22, 1988), in 82 AM. SoC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 371 (1988) (a panel discussion by W. Michael Reisman, Bruno Simma, Gunther
F. Handl, Christine Chinkin, and Pierre-Marie Dupuy).
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This model operates as a gloss on how law is viewed through the
functional, contextually informed communication lens mentioned
above. The model further demonstrates how and why communicators
are authorized to communicate, as well as who comprises the collective
target of such communication-a target audience. Thus, it is plain to see
that international lawmaking, or prescription, is itself a process of
communication that is comprised of a communicator, a target audience,
and varying degrees of interpretation. This communication exists as
signs or symbols of policy content, authority, and of controlling
intention. Specifically, these signs or symbols might be distilled to the
three communication and interpretation variables in the stated model:
(1) the "policy content," which is the prescription; (2) the "authority
signal," which is the legitimate basis from which to prescribe; and (3)
the "control intention," which is the enforcement power.91 In short, to be
considered law, international law and human rights regimes must have a
prescriptive policy content, which must be accompanied by signs or
symbols indicative of widespread community acceptance-under
international law, the community is the notional basis for authority-,
and it must also convey that some degree of institutionalized control
exists to ensure that the prescribed law is real.92
The model also sheds light on the extent to which communications
must have a prescriptive content to determine whether they connote
authority, as well as whether they are supported by the communicator's
controlling intention. Effective legal communications will generate
clarity regarding the specific rule or policy that the communication
90. See Reisman, International Lawmaking, supra note 74, at 108-10 (discussing these three
key aspects of prescriptive communication); McDougal & Reisman, The Prescribing Function,
supra note 74, at 250; see also McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process,
supra note 74.
91. Reisman, International Lawmaking, supra note 74, at 108-10.
92. See id (discussing the three aspects of prescriptive communication, which collectively
convey legal norms because they establish policy that emanates from a competent authority and
creates in the target audience an expectation that the policy content of the communication is itself
designed to control); see also McDougal & Reisman, The Prescribing Function, supra note 74, at
250-54; McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process, supra note 74; Nagan
& Hammer, supra note 16, at 151 (exploring how the constitutive process generally shapes
communication associated with conflict management to set out and preserve fundamental political
and juridical institutions of decision-making).
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prescribes. These communications must be clear, they must emanate
from a recognized authority, and they must be accompanied by an
expectation of controlling efficacy.93 Lasswell developed a similar
model years earlier, which distills his theory of communication into the
following six sequential questions:
* Who[?]
* Says What[?]
" [About What?]
" In Which Channel[?]
* To Whom[?]
* With What Effect?
94
The question, "Who?" examines the character of the participant
initiator of communication, (i.e. a control analysis). The question, "Says
What?" examines the content of the communication and, together with
the ostensibly implicit "About What?" question, provides a broader
context for content analysis. The question, "In Which Channel?"
examines the relevant channels of analysis (i.e., a medium analysis).
The "To Whom?" question examines the target of the initiators'
communication (i.e., a target-audience analysis). Finally, the
intersection of the impact of communication on a target audience, the
mode of transmission or exchange, and the further impacts upon the
initiators' perspectives collectively comprise the subject matter of the
"With What Effect?" question.
When we apply Lasswell's model directly to law at any level (local,
national, and international), the relevance of these questions becomes
immediately apparent. The "Who?" question is of chief importance:
93. See generally WILLIAM R. BISHIN & CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND
ETHICS (1972); NORMAN BRAND & JOHN 0. WHITE, LEGAL WRITING: THE STRATEGY OF
PERSUASION (3d ed. 1988); FRANK E. COOPER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING (1953); RUDOLF
FRANZ FLESCH, THE ART OF CLEAR THINKING (195 1); MICHAEL R. FONTHAM, WRITTEN AND
ORAL ADVOCACY (1985); VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, LEGAL THESIS WRITING AND FORENSIC
LITERATURE (1950); MORTON S. FREEMAN, THE GRAMMATICAL LAWYER (1979); WESLEY
GILMER, LEGAL RESEARCH, WRITING & ADVOCACY: A SOURCEBOOK (1978); RICHARD A.
GIVENS, DRAFTING DOCUMENTS IN PLAIN LANGUAGE (1981); GEORGE D. GOPEN, WRITING
FROM A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (1981); JOEL LARUS, LEGAL WORDS AND PHRASES: SPEED
ABBREVIATIONS (1965); IRVING M. MEHLER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL COMMUNICATION (1975);
DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (1963); WALTER PROBERT, LAW, LANGUAGE
AND COMMUNICATION (1972); ROBERT B. SMITH, THE LITERATE LAWYER: LEGAL WRITING
AND ORAL ADVOCACY (1986); JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE
NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (1973); JOSEPH M. WILLIAMS, STYLE: TEN
LESSONS IN CLARITY AND GRACE (9th ed. 2006).
94. Harold D. Lasswell, The Structure and Function of Communication in Society, in THE
COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS: A SERIES OF ADDRESSES 37, 37 (Lyman Bryson ed., 1964).
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Does the law (created or interpreted) emanate from a government
official? Is that official a judge, an administrator, a legislator, or an
international civil servant? Or does the law emanate from the private
sector? Is it actually rooted in political pressure exerted by a political
party, a corporation, or a non-governmental organization? An honest
answer to the "Who?" inquiry provides key insight into the power,
competence, authority, and expertise of the government system from
which the law emanates, as well as a keen understanding of the law
itself. In the context of international law, the "Who?" question is critical
for all participants because the communicator of the law indicates the
extent to which States are bound to obey it. Law that emanates from the
United Nations General Assembly, as opposed to the United Nations
Security Council, or a statement by the Secretary General, or by the
European Union, are each accompanied by understandings about the
law's area of effect.
Lasswell's second question, "Says What?," designates the content of
communication. Should this communication emanate as a prescriptive
statement, the form thus communicates wrongdoing by certain
participants and an expectation regarding those participants' future
conduct. While the next logical question, "About What?," was not
expressly stated by Lasswell, it was, by necessary implication, the next
communicative step, which indicates the primary importance of the
participants' comprehension of communication content within the
appropriate context within which it is communicated. Only by asking
"About What?" might these participants be able to determine the
expectations that accompany a prescriptive statement, or whether the
communication is accompanied by expectations of authority and
coercion; it thus provides key information into how these participants
might react.
The inquiry, "In Which Channel?" permits the target audience of the
communication to understand both its efficacy and its intended effect in
either practice or theory. Advanced mechanisms of communication are
ever more widespread and available to diverse sections of humanity,
resulting in a continuing exponential explosion of available
interpersonal channels. This, for example, means that there is a growing
series of channels devoted to the communication of human rights
prescriptions. Indeed, the communications revolution has compressed
both space and time in the development of expectations regarding
universal human rights law.
The question, "To Whom?," specifically designates the
aforementioned participants-the target audience of the communication.
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For example, "To Whom" is a Security Council Resolution addressed?
By comparison, "To Whom" is an Advisory Opinion of the World Court
addressed? From a human rights point of view, curious scholars might
wish to know whether the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
addressed exclusively to those States who have signed and ratified the
United Nations Charter, or whether it is addressed to every member of
the international community.
Finally, the question, "With What Effect?" obligates the target
audience to both act on the content of the communication, and to further
gauge the value of the communication in terms of its ultimate effect. If
the audience recognizes some direct or indirect effect that results from
the audience's action pursuant to the communication, critical legal
implications might result. It is important to note that the effect of
audience action might be zero change to the status quo, but this itself is
valuable information. If the effect of audience action means something
for law, it is crucial to determine the critical indicators in this process,
which might indicate that the communication has created some distinct
expectations regarding what is effective and what is ineffective under
the law.
As communications theory became a distinct field of social science
inquiry, the research objectives of the discipline became increasingly
well articulated. According to Bruce Lannes Smith, the objectives of
communications research are as follows:
[T]he central purpose of communication research theory and
methodology is to enable us to view as clearly as possible a
given communicator-communication-reaction process, from
beginning to end, in the frame of reference of general socio-
psychological ("behavioral") theory. A new theory or
methodological wrinkle is of interest if it enables us to probe
more deeply into the aims and perspectives (conscious and
unconscious) of a communicator; to express in a relatively terse
but accurate formula the main psychological, cultural and social
referents (to all those involved in the communication process) of
the content of his communication; to state unambiguously what
audiences (intended or fortuitous) he reached; how they reacted
(consciously and unconsciously) on the psychological, cultural,
and social levels; and what the effects of "feedbacks" of these
reactions were upon the communicator as he thereupon started a
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new cycle of the communication process.95
Lasswell's interest in the effects of communication on social process
was suggested early on in WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY,
where he concluded:
In face-to-face experience over a protracted period personalities
with parallel biopsychic structures and cultural technique may
communicate extensively. An act of communicating is bilaterally
complete when two autobiographies knowingly concur in the
frame of reference of symbols.
9 6
Lasswell recognized that these ideas required further scientific
refinement, which resulted in his pioneering work on the necessary
relationship between communications theory and a general theory of
"attention." 97 The communication of relevant signs and symbols means
little if it cannot garner such "attention." Lasswell summarized the core
functions of communications theory in light of the three fundamentals
of attention theory:
(a) surveillance of the environment, disclosing threats and
opportunities affecting the value position of the community and
of the component parts of it;
(b) correlation of the components of society in making a response
to the environment;
(c) transmission of the social inheritance. 98
Thus attention, context, and interpretation are processes of
communication that often occur in a legal context where law-
conditioned participants construe and interpret words, texts, codes,
statutes, constitutions, agreements, decided cases, and other sources of
law. The connection between interpretation and decision-making,
especially law-conditioned decision-making, is evident. 99 In their 1967
95. Bruce Lannes Smith, Trends in Research on International Communication and Opinion,
1945-55, 20 PUB. OPINION Q. 182, 189 (1956); see also BRUCE LANNES SMITH & CHITRA M.
SMITH, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND POLITICAL OPINION: A GUIDE TO THE
LITERATURE (1956).
96. HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY 149-50 (1935).
97. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN & AARON M. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING
AND SHAPING LAW: CASES, READINGS, COMMENTARY 12-13 (1987).
98. Charles A. McClelland, Communication, Political: International Aspects, in 3
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE 96 (David L. Sills ed., 1968).
99. The decision-making regimes of transnational governments and organizations must "make
as explicit as possible the principles of interpretation and application which influence their
decision making processes." MCDOUGAL, LASSWELL & MILLER, supra note 75, at 64. Also with
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book, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER, Lasswell, McDougal, and Miller introduce readers to a
decidedly interdisciplinary, goal-oriented approach to interpretation that
is itself a component of decision-making. The authors describe the
social process of communication as a "comprehensive process in which
communicators and audiences are both involved."100 This is further
explained as relational in the sense that relevant parties "play two
supplementary roles, one that of the initiator of messages, the other that
of the recipient."10' It follows that contextually, "the characteristic that
distinguishes a social interaction that is chiefly to be regarded as an act
of communication from what is primarily to be viewed as something
else."'
' 0 2
In part, the limitations on human rights are driven by practical
exigencies of the exercise of effective power, which occur both
nationally and internationally.'0 3 A significant element of effective
power is explained and justified, however, by the theory of positivism,
regard to how words, texts, codes, statutes, constitutions, agreements, and decided cases should
be interpreted, Justice and Professor Aharon Barak, current President of the Supreme Court of
Israel, argues in INTERPRETATION 1N LAW that the authoritative examination of constitutional
provisions-and by extension other sources of law-must be done in order to:
not.. freeze [an] existing situation... [because these sources] attempt[] to direct human
experience. Accordingly, it must be interpreted from the stand point of a broad outlook
and not in a technical manner... [because] interpretation from a broad outlook is an
interpretation which seeks to implement the objective purpose of the... text.... A broad
outlook is an outlook which observes the past, the present and the future. It is an
interpretation which entails an overall conception of the law at a given time and in a
given society.... The meaning of the.. .text is not fossilized...[and] is not static but is
dynamic, and the understanding of it changes with the generations.
Emanuel Gross, The Laws of War Waged Between Democratic States and Terrorist
Organizations, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 389, 431-32 (translating 3 AHARON BARAK, INTERPRETATION
IN LAW 84-85, 92 (1994)); see also AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 91-
92 (Sari Bashi trans., 2005).
100. McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & MILLER, supra note 75, at xii; see also id at 40 (seeking to
advance communication and interpretation to a policy-oriented and configurative approach, which
is influenced by "the genuine shared expectations of the particular parties to an agreement," as
well as by "efforts to further the realization of the basic pattern of value distribution and the
fundamental institutions that are compatible with the preferred system of public order").
101. Id. at xii.
102. Id.
103. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 23 (2001)
(stating that the organic relationship between human rights and State sovereignty incidentally
creates limitations on national and international efforts to advance human rights, and arguing that
States which evince some degree of stability comprise "the most important protector[s] of
individual human rights"). A balance between the collective claims based on State power and
sovereignty and individual claims to respect individual human rights has been explicitly grappled
with in Nagan & Hammer, supra note 16.
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which, as detailed earlier, makes sovereignty a central part of law based
on claims relating to international human rights by weakening efforts to
limit sovereignty. 10 4 Despite the permeability of the event manifold,
which, as indicated above, is a designation that Lasswell attributed both
to the State and the international community as a distinct entities,
sovereignty cannot be eclipsed.
Despite various arguments to the contrary,' 0 5 however, sovereignty is
susceptible to reasoned deconstruction using communications theory.
H.L.A. Hart deconstructed sovereignty using tools familiar to
conventional jurisprudence, to which he ascribed a sharp analytical edge
by simultaneously employing tools of ordinary language analysis
originally developed by the Oxford philosopher, J.L. Austin. Hart
postulated that the question, "What is law?," cannot be answered unless
the word "law" is understood as a system of social rules that
presupposes a context.10 6 In short, legal language assumes a context,
and this assumption reduces law to a specific form of language
communication, which is the concept of "rule."' 0 7 Hart recognized that
when the concept of sovereignty is thus reduced to orders backed by
threats, it effectively reduces the twin concepts of law and State to raw
power and has a markedly communicative effect.'
0 8
Hart's deconstruction of sovereignty grew out of a version of modem
communications theory which focuses on the ordinary use of words as a
critical indicator of meaning. A side-by-side examination of Lasswell's
later work against that of Hart demonstrates that Lasswell, too, sought
to deconstruct sovereignty using processes of human communication.
Specifically, Lasswell, together with Myres McDougal, sought to
deconstruct sovereignty by identifying a "world social process" that
identifies the individual as the chief participant who interacts with other
individuals using various processes of communication, including
"looking and listening; and more."'1 9 Lasswell and McDougal state that
"[t]he participants in the world social process are acting individually in
their own behalf and in concert with others with whom they share
104. See supra Part III (examining the negative human rights implications associated with
positivism).
105. See Nagan & Hammer, supra note 43; Nagan & Hammer, supra note 16.
106. See HART, supra note 25, at 80.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 79-88 (setting out the argument that a distinction exists between being obliged,
which hinges on the threat of force, and having an obligation, which hinges on the existence of
some accepted legal legitimacy; Hart thus warned against confusing prescriptive power with
obligation).
109. McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 29, at 7.
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symbols of common identity and ways of life of varying degrees of
elaboration."'" 0 Both Hart and Lasswell essentially harmonized on the
importance of liberty and individual freedom, and each yielded valuable
insights into how iterations of communications theory might be used to
perform critical intellectual tasks in deepening our understanding of
empirical aspects of national and international politics.
Correspondingly, positivism weakens the normative component of
general international law as a critical world order variable. In short,
international law and human rights still experience a major theoretical
problem-the intersection of legal positivism and sovereignty-which
has crucial practical consequences. The theory of positivism is itself a
significant condition of the definition and scope of both human rights
and the exercise of effective power among members of the international
community. " Nevertheless, it is widely claimed that human rights law
is a fundamental part of international law," l2 the observance of which is
110. Id.
111. The normativity of certain principles might be effectively expressed by reducing them to
practical imperatives. Certain statements of theory arguably have normative and deontic force
because they are contextually applicable in both micro levels (as in most social interaction-such
as interpersonal communication), and macro levels (as in the international legal system). Thus,
the content of certain theoretical arguments determines the force and scope of certain practices.
The practical implications of micro-law theory are extremely significant because they are
limitless. See Harold D. Lasswell, The Qualitative and the Quantitative in Political and Legal
Analysis, in QUANTITY AND QUALITY: THE HAYDEN COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND
CONCEPT 103, 108-11, 113-14 (Daniel Lerner ed., 1961).
112. See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 3, 7-9 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1984) (delineating twenty
prominent international human rights treaties); Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights
in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. I 110, 1110 (1982) ("Human rights is not just a political
and moral concept; it is a legal one as well."); Jochen A. Frowein, Opening Remarks: Sanctions
and Human Rights Law, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (Vera
Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001) ("Human rights form [a] part of [i]nternational [l]aw."); Louis
Henkin, Sibley Lecture Keynote Address: March 1994 Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," in
25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 38 (1996) ("The international system, having identified
contemporary human values, has adopted and declared them to be fundamental law, international
law."): Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 1, 12 (1982) (stating that "the human rights revolution that
began at the 1945 San Francisco Conference of the United Nations has deprived the sovereign
States of the lordly privilege of being the sole possessors of rights under international law," and
further exploring how sources of human rights law are generally binding on the international
community). See generally U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current
Development on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev. 1
(1981) (prepared by Aureliu Cristescu); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 552-99 (3d ed. 1979); HENKIN, supra note 38; HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1973); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990); LOUIS B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, THE
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"persuaded," "induced," or "compelled"'"1 3 by State agreements and
practices. This generates expectations associated with the authority
foundations of human rights, which is supported in part by the principle
of reciprocal tolerances and complex components of coercion to ensure
effective prescription, application, and enforcement. In actuality, many
more direct and indirect participants are involved in the process of
making and applying human rights law in the world community. The
trajectories of both human rights law and general international law are
structurally vertical and horizontal, and they also incorporate a
multitude of trajectories that encompass communicative relationships in
contexts large and small; indeed, to understand the international human
rights legal process, one must look at global versus local
communication.' 14
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1973); A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF
THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION: A STUDY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE (1973); Anthony
D'Amato, International Human Rights at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 22 INT'L LAW. 167
(1988); Eric Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal Order, 6 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 269 (1978); Theodore Meron, Norm Making and Supervision in International Human
Rights: Reflections on Institutional Order, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 754 (1982); Watson, supra note 5.
The significance of human rights law as a fundamental part of international law is also indicated
by the fact that most every State has accepted and endorsed the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); see also International Conference on
Human Rights, Apr. 22-May 13, 1968, Proclamation of Teheran, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41
(May 13, 1968); Setting International Standards in the Field of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 41/120,
at 178, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/120 (Dec. 4, 1986). Other major multilateral human rights treaties
have received similar, resounding international support as well. See, e.g., Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13
(entered info force Sept. 3, 1981); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976);
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21,
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). With regard to the international
response to these treaties, see, for example, The Secretary-General, Note by the Secretary-
General on the Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights,
Including Reporting Obligations Under International Instruments on Human Rights, delivered to
the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/44/668 (Nov. 8, 1989); The Secretary-General, Note by the
Secretary-General on the Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human
Rights, Including Reporting Obligations Under International Instruments on Human Rights, 36,
delivered to the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/50/505 (Oct. 4, 1995); Effective Implementation
of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting Obligations Under
International Instruments on Human Rights, Comm'n on Hum. Rts. Res. 1996/22, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/1996/22 (Apr. 19, 1996); and The Secretariat, Note by the Secretariat on the
Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting
Obligations Under International Instruments on Human Rights, delivered to the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/58/350 (Sept. 5, 2003).
113. See Henkin, supra note 112, at 32, 39.
114. See Nagan & Hammer, supra note 43, at 943-58.
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The policy-oriented approach to law has developed an articulate
general jurisprudential framework. According to Lasswell and
McDougal, all jurisprudence comprises a collective theory for inquiry
about law. Considerable effort has been given to the development of
jurisprudence from international, cross-cultural, and comparative
perspectives; the policy scientist is particularly concerned with the role
of law in the context of world public order. In the study of international
law and human rights, the policy-oriented approach focuses on a distinct
challenge for relevant academic inquiry. Specifically, the approach
accepts the importance of theory in relation to practice. 1 5 Through the
prism of international law, theory guides world public order. Noting the
inadequacy of past theories, the New Haven School developed an
applied form of its general theory of jurisprudence to the theory of
international law as a critical component of world public order, which
overarchingly sought to establish a universally applicable theory of
human dignity." 6 This systematic development of jurisprudence as a
theory for inquiry about human rights was itself an important
intellectual achievement not only for the New Haven School, but also
for the human rights field of study. Importantly, this continuing study
demonstrates that with the appropriate investigatory tools, the current
world order system might yield a powerful theory about human rights
that would have descriptive power, analytical sophistication,
prescriptive force, and normative justification.
Probing more deeply into the specific questions concerning what
international law and human rights law are, and how they are made,
applied, and enforced, are of central importance to the New Haven
School. The paramount importance placed on international law and
human rights law led to important developments in the description and
analysis of critical decision functions that have markedly
communicative characteristics, such as prescription, application,
115. See supra Part II.
116. See generally LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, supra note 4 (describing how international law
is derived from theories associated with authoritative processes of decision-making). McDougal
spent much of his auspicious career arguing that this authoritative process of decision-making is
designed to articulate and bring about a central policy objective-ubiquitous human rights norms
to which all peoples adhere. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 987-92, 992 (1960) ("The values we recommend for postulation as the goal values of
human dignity are.. merely the traditional values of humanitarianism and enlightenment
bequeathed to us by most of the great religions and secular philosophies prevailing in recent
centuries."). For writings analogous to the policy oriented approach, see FERNANDO R. TESON,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 11 (1988) ("' [A]n
international legal customary rule' requires a reliance on a value judgment which in turn can only
be understood within the framework of a broader moral-political theory.").
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termination, invocation, intelligence, and more. These decision
functions comprise tools to investigate the signs and the symbols of
international law and human rights law by chiefly exploring the actual
dynamics of how signs, symbols, and other forms of communication
operate.
Language-a primary channel of communication-is also a process
of interpretation; indeed, one that is well-developed in conventional law
and literature. Still, for the New Haven School, interpretation amounts
only to a starting point for inquiry. Deeper analyses are required to
understand more precisely the operational currency of forms of
communication in the actual practice of making, applying, and
enforcing international law and human rights law.
1 17
The ubiquity of communications in social process has micro and
macro implications in the study of international law, particularly human
rights law. The New Haven School has demonstrated that international
law might best be understood when practitioners employ tools of
communication to study it, because international law is the framework
for all human interaction." 8 Thus, communication-in both theory and
practice-is critical to legal discourse, and functions as a crucial point at
which law and human behavior intersect. Exploring this intersection
from a new angle might further develop current understandings of
human rights law.
117. Professor Robert Drinan's critical analysis of the communicative power of shaming
reveals that human rights regimes might be characterized by various, sometimes subtle, levels of
communication-typically beneath overt calls for action by the international community or non-
governmental organizations. See ROBERT F. DRINAN, THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME: A WORLD
VIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001). Compelling a State to act not out of self-interest but out of
certain pressures incidental to public shaming comprises an excellent example of how micro-
social behavior is effective on the international level. For analogous analyses, see, for example,
JAMES AVERY JOYCE, THE NEW POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1978); and Oscar Schachter,
Remarks at the Proceedings of the Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law: Compliance and Enforcement in the United Nations System (Apr. 19, 1991),
in 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 428 (1991).
118. Professor Reisman's contribution to the ongoing discourse on the nature of law is his
book, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS; it functions as an introduction to an interesting perspective of
the New Haven School. Each successive contribution by the New Haven school seemingly calls
for continuing analytical attention to the intersection of formal and informal law, particularly in
common situations and everyday life. Reisman's perspective, for example, advances the landmark
notion that all day-to-day social intercourse-in other words, all civil human interaction that is
beyond the purview of official State law-is actually governed by systems of "norms,"
"judgments," and "sanctions." See REISMAN, LAW N BRIEF ENCOUNTERS, supra note 74, at 39,
54. He builds on the New Haven School's previous efforts to set out a detailed analysis of how
situations-when measured against conventional notions of law that seem unregulated-actually
conform, at times quite subtly, to archetypal patterns of "micro-law." See id. at 158-59.
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IV. A RETREAT FROM FORMALISTIC POSITIVISM: THE MICRO-LAW
IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Among Harold Lasswell's greatest achievements was his startling
connection in WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY, where
Lasswell explored the idea that since the manifold is permeable, certain
key component parts of the manifold are vulnerable to influence.
Specifically, he found that events triggered in the global manifold can
and do penetrate the boundaries of the State and profoundly influence
the identity of the individual." 19 Thus, certain world events characterized
by uncertainty, instability, and the possibility of conflict can affect
national security by being manipulated into signs and symbols of
communication that penetrate the manifold and are used to attack the
personal security, or insecurity, of the individual. Lasswell's insight
employs communications theory to examine unvarnished weaknesses of
the State; it was indeed an extremely advanced theory. He subsequently
sought to develop this major theoretical insight; he soon founded the
notion that world politics and individual human relationships function
by using parallel rules, in what he characterized as macro-social and
micro-social contexts. 120 In short, Lasswell had a revolutionarily insight.
He established the proposition that decision functions comprise a
comprehensive, global array of activities that appear in every decisional
context in existence, from interpersonal human relationships (micro-
law) to geopolitics (macro-law), which Lasswell collectively referred to
as "multivalued models of the social process."'
' 21
119. See LASSWELL, supra note 96, at 217 ("Clearly, insofar as politics is the management of
symbols and practices related to the shape and composition of the value patterns of society,
politics can assume no static certainty; it can strive for dynamic techniques of navigating the tides
of insecurity generated within the nature of man in culture.").
120. Lasswell tasked himself with bringing clarity to international political processes by
ascertaining and classifying factors that underpin and motivate social behavior. See id Lasswell
thereafter continued to explore-via contextual mapping-human interaction and social
structures. See HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, How (1936); see
also Harold D. Lasswell & Allan R. Holmberg, Toward a General Theory of Directed Value
Accumulation and Institutional Development, in COMPARATIVE THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE
12 (Hollis W. Peter ed., 1966).
121. Lasswell, supra note 11, at 113. All subsequent analyses of micro-law are entirely
predicated on assumptions set out by Lasswell in this ground-breaking, foundational work. See,
e.g., REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS, supra note 74, at 2 ("The law of the state may be
important, but law, real law, is found in all human relations, from the simplest, briefest encounter
between two people to the most inclusive and permanent type of interaction."); Tina Grillo, The
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1556 (1991) ("The
norms that govern microlegal systems are unwritten and often not consciously perceived, but they
are always present."); Michael Reisman, Lining Up. The Microlegal System of Queues, 54 U.
CIN. L. REV. 417, 418-19 (1985) ("Like most other social situations, mundane microsituations-
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Lasswell's concept of micro-social law--or "micro-law"-recasts the
starting point of legal theory. This approach supports the proposition
that law does not begin with the State, but rather it has humbler, more
anthropomorphic beginnings; it starts with the individual person as a
communicative being. This approach therefore inverts not simply the
priority given to hierarchy, but roots a great deal of law in the human
subjectivities of ordinary persons-at least as a starting point and focus
of legal inquiry. To make the individual the starting point of legal
analysis and theory construction in law is also, coincidentally, to give a
literal meaning to the terms, "human" and "rights."
A great deal of human rights grapples with the problematic model
whereby States monopolize law-creation and, in an arguably
counterintuitive sense, human rights are meant to limit the State's power
to act arbitrarily or capriciously. Many States hold that human rights are
not rights unless they are specifically adopted by the State. The
reduction of much of the human rights prescription to treaty-based
instruments reflects how firmly this jurisprudential assumption is
grounded in a world dominated by sovereign States. What, then, is the
relationship between the law of the State and the law of micro-legal
systems?
Micro-legal systems are ubiquitous phenomena to which little
attention has been paid in traditional or conventional jurisprudence. An
analysis of micro-legal systems must begin with micro-social relations,
with an emphasis on the nature, scope, and legal relevance of human
communication systems. The focus of micro-law is not simply confined
to individual-to-individual communications. It is also historically
influenced by the tenuous position of small groups in social processes,
particularly identifiable out-groups and subgroups, which also constitute
a part of the State. Excellent examples are the Romani 122 cultural group
and Jewish peoples. 123 The Romani have long been victimized by
even with only two actors and of the shortest duration-have the complex and significant
normative components that are characteristic of law in its conventional usage."). For similar
iterations of Lasswell's concept, see THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT
BIND: A SOCIAL CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (1999); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 165-66 (1985); and Thomas W. Dunfee, The Role of Ethics in
International Business, in BUSINESS ETHICS: JAPAN AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 63, 69
(Thomas W. Dunfee & Yukimasa Nagayasu eds., 1993).
122. The Romani are also referred to as "Gypsies." See generally GYPSY LAW: ROMANI
LEGAL TRADITIONS AND CULTURE (Walter 0. Weyrauch ed., 2001) (compiling essays that
describe various aspects of Romaniya).
123. For thousands of years, Jewish peoples in the Diaspora have kept Jewish traditions and
Jewish law alive despite the minority character of Jewish peoples in the Middle East. See Calum
Carmichael, Gypsy Law and Jewish Law, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 269, 269-73 (1997).
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dominant classes or groups. Romani law is vibrant, alive, and well, even
though the Romani are typically a minority group, and have been
victims of racial prejudice in the States where they reside. If we are at
all sensitive to the law of non-State groups, why should we not be
concerned about the nature of the face-to-face relations they generate?
A. International Law and Small Group Dynamics: Toward a
Theory of International Micro-Law and Human Rights
Foundationally, many classic canons of legal thought hold that the
State "possess[es] the following qualifications: (a) a permanent
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to
enter into relations with the other states." 124 In short, a State's
identifiable, objective, formal decrees and authoritative communications
comprise what is generally regarded as "the law." Micro-law theory
effectively reverses the order of such traditional conceptions of priority
and attention. Society and culture are not pre-State and pre-law-they
are indeed the true repository of law itself, including human rights
law.125 The traditional emphasis on the ostensible objectivity of law is
124. Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165
L.N.T.S. 19. see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 201 (1987) ("Under international law, a State is an entity that has a defined territory
and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has
the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.").
125. Many international scholars agree that all law is rooted to some extent in culture and
society. There is, however, much dissent on how the specific character of law should be
understood in the context of culture and society. The differing ranks of authoritative international
commentators might generally be divided into two groups: those who perceive law as a wholly
autonomous manifestation, which might be transplanted among every type of State and society,
and those who perceive law as a manifestation rooted in very particular social, geo-political,
economic, or religious contexts, which cannot be transplanted into other contexts or which would
reject efforts to reform or replace such central contexts in favor of a different, transplanted form
of law. With regard to the former group, see ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF WESTERN
PRIVATE LAW 261 (expanded ed. 2001) (arguing that while law is not created outside of social
contexts, it nevertheless does not reflect society). In short, this group argues that law is not
necessarily tailored to particular social or cultural contexts because law is an amalgam, created by
borrowing elements from a variety of other legal and governmental systems, and thus is not
particularly reflective of the expectations or ideals of the individual society or cultural group for
which such law was created. See id. Professor Daniel Visser describes this process, stating that
"lawyers.. have been trained to look in books... [and make] law and constructed dogma by
reading other lawyers...." D.P. Visser, The Legal Historian as Subversive, or: Killing the
Capitoline Geese, in ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF LAW 1, 18 (D.P. Visser ed., 1989); see also
William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J.
COMP. L. 489 (1995); Alan Watson, From Legal Transplants to Legal Formants, 43 AM. J.
COMP. L. 469 (1995). With regard to the latter group, see JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF
THE LAW 451 (1968), for a discussion on the concept of Volksgeist ("national character") in the
German juridical and scientific tradition, which holds that law can only truly be understood if it is
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somewhat subverted by the centrality given to human subjectivities,
such as the recognition that common human perspectives of identity,
demand, and expectation are expressed through complex human
channels of human communication, as opposed to formulaic State
channels. In short, human subjectivities such as needs, wants, and
claims, as well as expectations of civility and change, are brought
within the focus of effective inquiry into law and human
communication. 126 This does not mean that classic jurisprudential
questions are unimportant, but it does mean that they are not quite as
viewed though the lens of a particular group, in this case the German people. This approach
generally argues that law is the product of a particular State's entire history, the manner of its
genesis, and the evolving character of its societal development and common experience. See
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 59-67 (2d ed. 1985). Celebrated United
States Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who once stated that "[t]he life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience," arguably subscribed to this school of thought. Steven
J. Burton, Introduction, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 2 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000); see also Winston P. Nagan, Not Just a
Descending Trail: Traversing Holmes' Many Paths of the Law, 49 FLA. L. REV. 463 (1997).
Despite these divergent approaches, these groups might arguably agree that human rights law is
sufficiently universal in that the rights it affords are simultaneously couched in society and
culture, and are still transcendental and absolute. It is not difficult for these international scholars
to adopt such a Kantian standpoint because it is well accepted that, while human rights law is
derived from social and cultural contexts, no room exists for cultural relativism with regard to its
application. See MIECZYSLAW MANELI, JURIDICAL POSITIVISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1981)
(referring generally to the positivist theory of human rights law, which is based on contextual
social and political realities and is a universal part of positive international law). Human rights
scholars have distilled from copious sources of international law a number of sufficiently
universal, peremptory human rights norms-orjus cogens principles-which overcome culturally
relative arguments to the contrary. The Restatement (Third) provides that a State contravenesjus
cogens principles in the event that:
it practices, encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the
murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic
racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987); see
also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(describing these jus cogens principles as "accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as.. norm[s] from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by... subsequent norm[s] of general international law having the same
character"). This consensus is reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
affirms that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, pmbl., U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
126. See REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS, supra note 74, at 2 ("Law is a property of
interaction. Real law is generated, reinforced, changed, and terminated continually in the course
of almost all of human activity.").
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central. There is continuing fascination among international scholars
about why a norm, a rule, or even a gesture might qualify as real law;
how law is differentiated from non-law; and how in the deep structures
of human behavior, moral and ethical experiences may control
behavioral rules, and might very well count as law. 127 Indeed, some
participants in the ongoing dialogue regarding the relationship between
communications theory and the rule of law, particularly human rights
proponents, might wonder if it is a fruitless exercise to drive an
inflexible wedge between communication, values, and what counts as
law.128 To respond to these concerns, it would be useful to provide a
broader jurisprudential background to the themes that animate the
theory of micro-law and human rights.
A vigorous and interesting body of literature addresses how the law
of small groups functions in a variety of contexts. During the 1960s,
NASA engaged in research regarding small group normative structures
to select cohesive groups comprised of compatible individuals for future
missions to the far reaches of space. Studies such as Walter Weyrauch's
The "Basic Law" or "Constitution" of a Small Group129 and Law in
Isolation-The Penthouse Astronauts130 are examples of the interest of
legal scholars and anthropologists in law outside the normative and
127. The Sophists of ancient Greece contended that law and elements of social intercourse
were dictated by human wants, needs, and expectations, as opposed to arbitrary convention or
general custom. See CHARLES S. SEELEY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT 104
(1953). Indeed, the quote famously attributed to Protagoras-"[Mian is the measure of all things:
of those which are, that they are, and of those which are not, that they are not" -has been
interpreted to mean that humanity ("man") is the standard by which all things are created and
judged, including and perhaps particularly law, and thus only that which appears to the individual
is at the heart of all things. PLATO, THEAETETUS 16 (John McDowell trans., 1973). For more on
Protagoras and relativity, see CRANE BRINTON, IDEAS & MEN: THE STORY OF WESTERN
THOUGHT 38-39 (1950). See also RICHARD LEMPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO
LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: DESERT, DISPUTES, AND DISTRIBUTION 27-30, 60-66 (1986)
(arguing that human wants, needs, and expectations form the basis for law, as well as for
accountability in the event that such law is contravened). For international recognition that human
wants, needs, and expectations must be respected, see U.N. Charter arts. 1, 3, 55, 56.
128. The eminent judge and professor Guido Calabresi has suggested that social forces are
implicated to some extent in what counts as law because private preferences, social norms, and
what counts as law are interrelated. See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND
THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 84 (1985) (stating that law
is "fundamentally concerned with shaping tastes").
129. Walter 0. Weyrauch, The "Basic Law" or "Constitution" of a Small Group, 27 J. SOC
ISSUES 49 (1971) (documenting an experiment in which several Berkeley students were locked in
a penthouse for three months; the focus of this experiment was the evolutive character of law).
Professor Weyrauch recounts some details of this experiment in Walter 0. Weyrauch, Unwritten
Constitutions, Unwritten Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1211, 1215-20 (1999).
130. Walter 0. Weyrauch, Law in Isolation-The Penthouse Astronauts: An Experimental
Group Cut Offfrom the World Makes Its Own Rules, 5 TRANS-ACTION, June 1968, at 39.
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political boundaries of the State and the tolerance of multiple legal
systems of such groups within a State.' 3' Indeed, legal scholars identify
unofficial indigenous law, Islamic law, Hindu law, and Jewish law as
sources of unofficial law, along with a discrete system of "people's
law."'
132
Living law is remarkable because its very existence indicates that a
body of law has resisted State legal absolutism and has managed to
flourish, as well. Moreover, it is remarkable because it is found not only
in situations where obvious sub-groups are identified, but it is also an
intrinsic component of social organization in its widest possible reach.
As mentioned above, a prime illustration of this phenomenon is Jewish
law, which asserts that a tradition of oral communication-delineating
laws and doctrinal interpretive instructions-was adopted by Moses,
and was subsequently developed and elucidated in the central document
of Judaism: the Torah. 133 Continuing Jewish persecution forced rabbinic
leaders to put these oral traditions into writing, resulting in the
Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds. 134 Adaptation and endurance in the
face of extreme adversity are key aspects of the living law. Indeed, the
very idea of a living law attests to the dynamism and vibrancy of the
structure of social organization, even in situations of extreme
repression. This too is quite simply an indicator of judicial philosophy.
In exploring the broader implications of Hart's identification of the
social ubiquity of rules and precepts in human communication systems,
we suggest that there are implications in this insight of normative
significance. One of the important foundations of human rights-as a
jurisprudentially justifiable aspect of law-is the possibility that the
roots of social rules and precepts may indeed reflect the deep
microstructure of moral experience. If social rules and precepts are
functions of human interaction on a face-to-face micro-level within
131. A key anthropological work on law in tribal societies is BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI,
CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926), which generally made the revolutionary
arguments that every society-Western and non-Western-is governed by some form of law, and
that field ethnography-an exploratory technique previously limited to anthropology-can also
be employed to explore the use of such law from society to society. See also MAX GLUCKMAN,
THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE (1965); E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE
MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS (1954); K. N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON
HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE
(1941); LEOPOLD POSPIIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY (1971).
132. See G. J. VAN NIEKERK, Legal Pluralism, in INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PLURALISM IN
SOUTH AFRICA: PART I: CUSTOMARY LAW, 8-12 (J.C. Bekker, J.M.T. Labuschagne & L.P.
Vorster eds., 2002).
133. See ARYEH KAPLAN, THE HANDBOOK OF JEWISH THOUGHT 180-81 (1979).
134. Seeid. at 187.
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society, and if these rules reflect deeply rooted expectations about the
production and distribution of desired values, then these rules implicate
moral experience at its most elementary level. The study of human
beings in micro-social relationships may tell us a great deal about the
identification of the cultural rules that form patterns of cultural behavior
and about the origin of the value preferences and moral rules that are
embedded in the deep structure of social relations and psychological
experience.
Micro-law pushes small group law to the outer edges of the group. It
can be observed in face-to-face, ordinary behavior, such as looking, 35
queuing, 136  or communicating deferentially with professional
superiors. 137 Micro-law is complex, ubiquitous, and upon reflection and
analysis, interesting. Its interest and complexity is rooted in an idea
made fashionable early in the last century-that observers with
appropriate foci could discern a law beyond the law of the State in
social relations; the observer could witness "living law." This
intellectual debt is owed to Eugen Ehrlich, who famously coined the
phrase, "living law."' 38 Hoebel and Llewellyn gave operational effect to
Ehrlich's living law idea in their famous collaborative work, THE
CHEYENNE WAY. 13 9 Among the important behavioral insights in that
great work was that a non-State tribally organized body politic could
have, upon focused observation, a living constitutional system that
generates a system of law with authority, prescriptive content, and
components of efficacy and sanctions. Perhaps this tradition is not quite
as theoretically fashionable as it once was. 140 But it is this tradition and
135. See REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS, supra note 74, at 21-50 ("Chapter 1:
Looking, Staring, and Glaring").
136. See id. at 51-96 ("Chapter 2: Standing in Line and Cutting In"); see also Reisman, supra
note 126.
137. See REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS, supra note 74, at 97-148 ("Chapter 3:
Rapping and Talking to the Boss").
138. The paterfamilias of legal sociology, Eugen Ehrlich articulated the concept of lebendes
Recht, or "living law." Ehrlich posited that jurists must learn law from actual observation; law
must be gleaned from the way in which it is expressed in social conduct or contemporary custom,
as opposed to teasing it out of codes or academic papers. See EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 497 (1936). Ehrlich asserted that "[t]he living law is not
the.. content of the document that the courts recognize as binding when they decide a legal
controversy, but only that part which the parties actually observe in life." Id.
139. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 131 (exploring the "law-ways" and the "juristic
beauty" of the Cheyenne).
140. The use of ethnography in the study of law was greeted with marked skepticism from the
academic legal community of the early twentieth century. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM
AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 18 (1986). Fascinating results eventually encouraged academics to
conclude that the approach was revolutionary, and it was thus celebrated. See WILLIAM TWINING,
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perspective that in part inspires the general theory of micro-legal
systems. 
1 4 1
B. The Intersection of Communications Theory, Small Group Law,
and Micro-Law. Critical World Order Lessons
Micro-law builds on communications theory and the living law of
small groups, and it may be compared and contrasted with more
fashionable currents of conventional legal theory. 142 In an elemental
sense, the signs and symbols of law encapsulate its substantive and
procedural meanings. In this perspective, law is tied to the core ideas
behind the process of interpersonal and inter-community
communications that only occur through the management and transfer
of signs and symbols. 143 This not only makes communication a central
KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973). However, following World War II,
collectivist notions of human behavior such as Hoebel's and Llewellyn's were increasingly
regarded as outmoded, perhaps in light of the ever-increasing level of import placed on
individualism. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, What Law Cannot Do for Inter-Racial Peace, 3 VILL.
L. REV. 30, 31-34 (1958) (arguing that the general anthropological concept of the "folkway" can
be cross-applied to racial integration tactics, and redefining American civil rights by weighing
pro-integration arguments against broad social upheaval associated with the strain of changing
one's social customs in a variety of different social contexts, such as restaurants, social clubs, and
public areas including public parks and beaches). Professors Weyrauch's and Reisman's
continuing work with the concept of micro-law suggests that cross-applying law-specific, general
anthropological concepts regarding social interaction to groups of people no longer smacks of
such obsolescence.
141. Reisman addresses these concepts in LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS. See REISMAN, LAW
1N BRIEF ENCOUNTERS, supra note 74, at 2 ("The law of the state may be important, but law, real
law, is found in all human relations, from the simplest, briefest encounter between two people to
the most inclusive and permanent type of interaction."). See also Walter 0. Weyrauch & Maureen
Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the "Gypsies," 103 YALE L.J. 323, 326-29
(1993) (exploring the existence of oral legal traditions within the meaning of normative examples
of the rule of law).
142. Reisman challenges the idea still critical to conventional legal theory that law is
essentially the product of the State, though his work does not extensively deal with the
international law and human rights implications of micro-legal systems. See REISMAN, LAW IN
BRIEF ENCOUNTERS, supra note 74, at 156-58.
143. The conceptual underpinnings of micro-law theory might be based in part on semiotics,
the study of signs and symbols. As Roberta Kevelson suggests, semiotics-and perhaps, by
extension, micro-law--explores ideas that are in and of themselves "intellectual signs" and
indeed:
the meaning of a sign is based on the mutual agreement between users of the sign... [so
that]... [s]igns designate aspects of the real world through contractual action, through a
kind of trust... [and] an individual fact is meaningless.... Thus to speak of a fact is to
speak of a community of qualitative likenesses and differences, and therefore to make a
judgment through reason.
ROBERTA KEVELSON, CHARLES S. PEIRCE'S METHOD OF METHODS 5-6 (1987). In another book,
she continues that societies characterized by effective legal systems:
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part of what it is to be a lawyer, 144 but it also highlights an important
aspect of what it means to be human and thus part of a social unit or
community. The self is partly defined by non-self others and vice
versa-a crucial component of what a person is and how a community
functions-and thus much of human identity is rooted in the way that
people communicate. 145 To the extent that law is an outcome of
community interaction, law will doubtless reflect patterns of
communication characteristic of the group and the participants who
constitute it.
146
All communication is not law, but all law partakes of the signs and
symbols of communication. 147 Jurisprudence does not always emphasize
the fact that whatever else law is, it is a process whereby certain signs
and symbols are vested with juridical meanings. Perhaps it would be
rest[] not on the assumption that the world is fully created once and for all, but rather on
the belief in the possibility of real change in the world, that is, on the conviction that the
universe becomes and not that it is, that something really new may be created, and that
this real novelty is not manifest in the actual order of things but is present in the
evolving concepts of signs which stand for a reinterpretation of values and meanings of
relationships between things.
ROBERTA KEVELSON, THE LAW AS A SYSTEM OF SIGNS 35 (1988).
144. United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once asserted that "a lawyer who
has not studied economics and sociology is very apt to become a public enemy." Louis D.
Brandeis, The Living Law, in THE CURSE OF THE BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS
D. BRANDEIS 316, 325 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934) (quoting Professor Charles Henderson).
145. See John L. Austin, The William James Lectures at Harvard University, Lectures VII, IX
(1955), in J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 83, 108 (1962) (exploring elements of
verbal communication, such as how words might be employed in a "constative" as well as a
"performative" sense, and delineating different forms of verbal communication: "locutionary
acts," "illocutionary acts," and "perlocutionary acts"); see also Peter Andersen, Cues of Culture:
The Basis of Intercultural Differences in Nonverbal Communication, in INTERCULTURAL
COMMUNICATION: A READER 244 (Larry A. Samovar & Richard E. Porter eds., 8th ed. 1997)
(exploring proxemics-the study of how people use space, distance, and other body language to
communicate-from a cross-cultural standpoint).
146. Law is highly conditioned by the nature of the human communications process. See, e.g.,
MARK VAN HOECKE, LAW AS COMMUIMCATION (2002) (discussing how human interaction and
communication make and legitimatize law, and how democratic legal systems, as well as judges,
legislators, and legal scholars, must reflect pluralism and various levels of communication to be
effective).
147. See Herbert H. Clark & Thomas B. Carlson, Hearers and Speech Acts, 58 LANGUAGE,
June 1982, at 332, 344 ("[A]ddressees are the ostensible targets of what is being said.. [because]
they are the participants for whom the speaker has the most direct and obvious goals in designing
his utterances."); see also Willem J. Witteveen, Significant, Symbolic and Symphonic Laws:
Communication Through Legislation, in SEMIOTICS AND LEGISLATION: JURISPRUDENTIAL,
INSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 27, 30 (Hanneke van Schooten ed., 1999)
(stating that, in order to be effective, some forms of law must be tailored to designated groups of
people, who Witteveen generally designates as "the citizenry, and that, "[i]n order for meaningful
information processing to take place, the same codes must be used in sending and receiving").
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more accurate to talk about law-conditioned communication as
communication vested not simply with signs, markers, and symbols, but
also simultaneously with meanings that are distinctive from other
culturally developed markers, signs, and symbols. For example, legal
communication may have an articulate prescriptive content; it may be
supported or seen as being derived from a symbol of authority, making
the sign or marker one supported by symbols of authority and
legitimacy in the society. 148 Additionally, it may hold an expectation of
some level of efficacy, and some measure of coercion, however
"symbolic," may be deployed in support of the relevant marker, sign, or
symbol. 149 All of the above would seem to be anthropomorphically
obvious, but it is not that obvious to legal culture. Human beings
communicate their interactive signs and symbols using words. 150 Words
can often stabilize meanings in ways that non-verbal signs and symbols
cannot approximate. Words are vital to lawyering, and they are vital to
being human. They do not exhaust the possibilities of human
communication of meaning, let alone meanings vested with the signs
and symbols of a non-verbal nature. Nonetheless, non-verbal
communication-or "meta-communication"-is expressive of wants,
desires, moods, ideals, and aesthetics, as well as taboos and totemized
ritual rules and expectations.' 5 1 It will be apparent that communications
148. The substance of prescriptive communication is comprised of the signs or symbols of:
(1) the "policy content," (i.e., the prescription), (2) the "authority signal," (i.e., the legitimate
position from which to prescribe), and (3) the "control intention," (i.e., the enforcement power).
In short, law must have a prescriptive policy content, and, since the community is the notional
basis for the authority of law, it must be accompanied by symbols or signs indicative of
widespread community acceptance. Further, it must be accompanied by a conception that some
institutionalized control exists to ensure that the prescribed law is real. See McDougal, Lasswell
& Reisman, The World Constitutive Process, supra note 74; Reisman, International Lawmaking,
supra note 74, at 108-10. According to Professor F. Reed Dickerson,
communication is possible only when the response habits and collateral assumptions
otherwise necessary to understanding it are shared by the author and his particular
audience. Furthermore, in the case of a legal communication such as a statute or
regulation, it cannot be officially interpreted or applied unless the underlying response
habits and collateral assumptions are shared also by the enforcing or interpreting
authority.
F. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 116 (1975).
149. See McDougal & Reisman, The Prescribing Function, supra note 74, at 250-54.
150. See GARTH GILLIAN, FROM SIGN TO SYMBOL 7 (1982) ("The sign defines its spread and
signifying extension in and through the interpretant toward which it looks for its essential
clarification and for its ultimate grounding as a significant utterance within human discourse.").
151. See, e.g., RAY L. BIRDWHISTELL, KINESICS AND CONTEXT: ESSAYS ON BODY MOTION
COMMUNICATION (1970); RANDALL P. HARRISON, BEYOND WORDS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION (1974); MARK L. KNAPP & JUDITH A. HALL, NONVERBAL
COMMUNICATION 1N HUMAN INTERACTION (5th ed. 2002); DALE G. LEATHERS, NONVERBAL
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theory is not only critical to a realistic jurisprudence, but it is also
critical to the jurisprudence of human rights itself.
C. The International Human Rights Law Discourse: Further
Significance of Micro-Law and Policy Orientation
The rules, norms, precepts, and concepts that govern ordinary human
interactions and exchanges are far more important for law and legal
theory than has been generally understood. Since micro-social
relationships may be complicated and at times difficult to observe, the
observer is left with the task of developing a disciplined focus on actual
behavior that is simultaneously respectful of particular, cultural detail,
yet still broad enough to yield interesting insights into the processes of
micro-social behavior in general, which is accepting of the notions that
such behavior is conditioned by tacit culturally and geographically
relative rules, understandings, and moral and ethical standards. Further,
an authoritative analysis must pay particular attention to the
consequences of these behaviors with regard to any implicit, though
typically misunderstood, precepts that shape the general give-and-take
character of human communication across class, gender, culture,
religious, age, state citizenship, and other lines of human demarcation.
An effective way to approach such an analysis might be to concentrate
on a central feature of human exchange that is itself central to law: the
process of human communication.
At the risk of oversimplification, it seems that policy-oriented
communications theory gels with proponents of micro-social law with
regard to placing importance on law-based communications as opposed
to those created by the State. The policy orientation also emphasizes the
conditions and consequences of human exchanges and human
interactions in society: the rules, norms, precepts, and concepts that
govern human interaction and exchanges are to be fleshed out by
focusing on actual interactions and relationships.'
52
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS (1976).
152. In appraising international law as a process of communication, members of the New
Haven School have drawn on law-conditioned communication in domestic and international
contexts. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 87; Reisman, International
Lawmaking, supra note 74; W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of
International Law, Address at the Eighty-Sixth American Society of International Law
Proceedings: The Jurisprudence of International Law: Classic and Modem Views (Apr. 1-4,
1992), in 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 118 (1992). For example, W. Michael Reisman focuses
on the protection of foreign investment and the role of domestic fora in projecting and influencing
the development of international standards in this area. This study provided a careful approach to
the question of whether certain norms meet criteria of authority, content, and efficacy. See W.
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It will therefore be seen that international law, which we may
designate as macro-law, is effectively reducible to a functional
communications model. Human rights law is a part of macro-law in the
sense that it is a part of international law, but it is rooted in the
individual and is not a by-product of the State. This suggests that the
international legal system and its human rights components represent a
more complex and interesting challenge for theory and practice. Indeed,
the distinction classically held between public law and private law
seems to be subverted when we recognize the realism of the proposition
that public international law, human rights law, and private international
law are really indispensable and complementary components of a
broader process of legal ordering in the world community. Law, in this
view, might be as legitimately derived from the vast context of a global
community process as from the behavior and dynamics of small group
behaviors and interactions. There is abundant literature on lawmaking in
small groups outside of the State, and micro-law complements this
literature and brings together a coherent theory related to the
communications process to distill the outlines of micro-legal systems
comparatively, cross-culturally, and in a sense, universally. The central
insight of micro-law is that behaviors, even in micro-situations,
involving only two actors and of the briefest duration, may generate
outcomes that are of normative importance and that might have all of
the characteristics of law in functional terms. These track the
complexity of expectation-creating behaviors:
1. expectations, shared by the people in the situation, that in that
situation, there is a "right" way of acting, a "norm";
2. expectations that defections from the "right" way will lead to
a shared judgment that the defection was "wrong"; and
3. expectations that the injured party is authorized to undertake
certain responses that may hurt or sanction the offending actor
but at the very least must reaffirm the norm that has been
violated. 153
Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSJD Arbitration, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 739, 742 ("In international law, one of the traditional controls on the exercise of power by
states in which foreign investments had been made was the insistence that putative applications of
local law be subject to international review under a variety of criteria."); see also W. MICHAEL
REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION:
BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR (1992).
153. REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS, supra note 74, at 39. For the private law view,
see Winston P. Nagan & Danie Visser, The Global Challenge to Legal Education: Training
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Micro-law may on the surface appear to be grappling with ordinary,
uninteresting phenomena. Ordinary people often have "brief'
encounters with law. Driving forty miles per hour in a thirty-five mile-
per-hour zone might generate a response from a traffic officer. This
officer might issue a warning in place of a moving violation citation,
depending on the race, gender, or appearance of the driver in question.
Each manner of encounter-be it couched in a stern warning, sexual
flirtation, racial profiling, etc.-would likely be contextually relevant to
its outcome. Indeed, the brevity of such an encounter might govern its
outcome. There may even be no eye contact (or "eye encounter") at all.
These encounters may not be particularly interesting, unless one notes
the obvious that race, gender, and other symbols of identity may
influence the brevity or length of the encounter. It would hardly be a
deep sociological or legal insight. In fact, it is intellectually challenging
and distinctive in its contribution to legal theory, particularly in its
capacity to broaden our understanding of legal theory and to provide a
flexible focal lens for the legal inquirer. Moreover, it deepens our
understanding of the foundation of human rights law.
The idea of micro-law radically expands the boundaries of law in a
functional sense. However, micro-law covers a great deal more than
simply expanding the boundaries about what counts or should count as
law. Indeed, micro-law is an outcome of the deep structure of human
relations. This emphasis has important insights of value to social and
behavioral scientists as well as to moral philosophers. Let us briefly
assay the context from which such inquiry emerges to appreciate its
originality and salience.
The structure and function of small groups, such as kinship units,
affection units, friendship circles, or even relations between agents and
principals and other forms of relatively institutionalized human
associations, is a well-traveled path for social and behavioral theory and
law. But to assay and give coherence, structure, and meaning to barely
discernable forms of human relations-relations that are
institutionalized only in a diffuse and opaque sense-is in fact a
significant step forward in social theory, and for that matter, legal
theory. The central focus of inquiry is into social events and
situations-"brief encounters"-that with the right focal lens will
disclose certain universal characteristics, the most important of which is
Lawyers for a New Paradigm of Economic, Political and Legal-Cultural Expectations in the 21st
Century, II ILSA J. INT'L & COMp. L. 9, 30-37 (2004) (generally arguing that private law is
anthropomorphic).
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that even in brief encounters or situations, there are prescriptive norms
that actually operate, whether from conscious or unconscious behaviors
or motivations. A central feature of what we call "law" is also
characterized by a prescribing process,1 54 although for conventional law
this is usually deemed to emerge from the State or the sovereign.'55 But
prescription is ubiquitous in micro and macro situations. If we merely
look around us, we shall see, hear, and feel prescriptive behavior; we
shall note that we participate regularly in making, creating, confirming,
or changing social norms and prescriptions. These prescriptions emerge
as understood norms, and come with the expectation of contingent
sanctions of some sort. 156 Prescription of norms and the expectation or
154. The New Haven School of Jurisprudence generally views lawmaking-or prescription-
as a process of communication that is comprised of signs or symbols of policy content, an
authority signal, and symbols of controlling intention. Essentially, law has a prescriptive policy
content, which is accompanied by signs or symbols that indicate widespread community
acceptance. This acceptance must be accompanied by a conception that some institutionalized
control exists to ensure that the prescribed law is real. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The
World Constitutive Process, supra note 74.
155. See AUSTIN, supra note 30, at 1-25.
156. Another example of interest emerges from a meeting between Justice Albert "Albie"
Sachs of the South African Constitutional Court and a Special Branch Operative who was tasked
with assassinating Justice Sachs in 1988, when Sachs was a part of the anti-apartheid movement.
Justice Sachs describes the encounter as follows:
He phoned me in my chambers before giving evidence to get amnesty from the Truth
Commission. And it was quite an intense moment, as you can imagine, opening the
security door in our building and being face to face looking into his eyes, 'So this is the
man who tried to kill me', and I can see him looking at me, 'So this is the man I tried to
kill.' And when we walked down to my chambers I remember he had a stiff military
stride, and I put on my best judge's ambulatory stroll, to be in command even of that
situation. And we spoke for a long time, and eventually I stood up; and his name was
Henry, and I said, 'Normally when I say goodbye to somebody I shake their hand, but I
can't shake your hand. But your [sic] help the Truth Commission, help South Africa,
give the information that you've got to give, maybe we'll meet one day, who knows.'
And when we walked back down the corridor I noticed he was shuffling along, really
like a defeated soldier on retreat. And I closed the security gate and he disappeared.
Months later, I was at a party and I hear a voice saying, 'Albie, Albie'. My God, it's
Henry, I couldn't believe it, that he should be... [among] a party of journalists and radio
people and film makers, and he was beaming, he was very excited. And I said, 'What
happened, what happened?' [and] we got into a comer to get away from all the dance
music, and.. he's using first-name terms, he's calling me Albie, as though he's kind of a
mate.... And he said, 'And I helped them [at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission]
as you said.' And I said, 'Henry, I've only got your face to say that you're telling me the
truth,' and I put out my hand and I shook his hand. He went away absolutely elated, I
almost fainted, I felt very heavy.
I discovered afterwards that in fact he went home and cried for two weeks. And that
had more impact on me than if he'd been sent to jail. He was part of a generation,
working in the way that they did, defending an evil system in an evil way. It wouldn't
make my arm grow to put him in jail, to be vindictive against him, but the thought that
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contingency of sanctions, however mild, opaque, or diffuse, are also the
stuff of micro-law. Micro-law may structurally be seen as an outcome of
micro-relations, but more accurately, there is a deep symbiosis between
micro-social events, situations, and relations-and micro-law. The
norm-making or prescriptive/sanctions element of micro-law is thus a
key to a general theory of micro-social relations, which is the central
insight of the theory of micro-law. From recognition of prescriptions
and sanctions comes further appreciation for even subtler characteristics
of micro-law. Indeed, lurking in the finely nuanced interstices of the
concept are compelling world order implications on which some
scholars have been brave enough to act, resulting in critical successes
for humanity.
A remarkable example of the importance of micro-social law in the
world order environment is found in the World Bank Group, a network
of five international organizations that provides developing States with
economic aid and technical assistance to achieve poverty reduction. The
World Bank recognized that to alleviate poverty and reduce
powerlessness, some development initiatives must be conducted at the
micro-social level. The Bank has thus undertaken activities designed to
he had contributed the little bit he had to contribute which was information knowledge,
that he was willing to make a step to acknowledge what he'd done, and that he had had
that feeling of introspection that had caused him to re-examine his whole life and feel
the total moral defeat of the things that he'd stood for, that was very powerful, and I felt
stronger for it. I didn't feel I'd been weak, I felt if anything, I'd grown a little bit. That I
can live in the same country with that person. That somehow we inhabit the same moral
territory, that if he sits down next to me in a bus I'm not going to feel there's some
hidden agent out there that tried to exterminate me, that's still around in this country,
that dreadful mystery has gone. And there's a real person who's come up, a person like
me, back in that world, back in the country, and we can be citizens living under the
same constitution.
Damien Carrick, Submitted Heroes-Albie Sachs: From Freedom Fighter to Judicial
Powerhouse, Universal Rights Network (May 6, 2004), http://www.universalrights.net/heroes/
display.php3?id=68 (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). This example not only indicates the deep
structure of normative experience and the competition about which norms are licit or not, but it
also puts the competition for these norms in a micro-social situation that has clear sanctioning
components. In the case of Justice Sachs, his initial unwillingness to shake the hand of Henry is
not a vindictive emotion as he later suggests, but rather a form of micro-sanction that seeks to
defend a core value of dignity and respect which Henry had outrageously breached. Walking
authoritatively in front of Henry and subsequently declining the handshake are highly
communicative micro-sanctions. His later offer of a handshake was a tremendously significant
moment for Henry, and though Justice Sachs did not articulate his approval of Henry's ostensible
desire to support the goals of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, his action communicated
volumes in the micro-law realm. Another insight garnered from this event might be the
importance of competitive normative priorities in micro-social situations, and how norms may be
confirmed, modified, or even changed in the deep structure of human relations, which might later
emerge as culturally accepted axioms of social coexistence.
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interact directly with civil society in developing States using micro-
social approaches to poverty alleviation. Kreszentia Duer, the World
Bank's Program Manager for New Bank Practices in Civic Engagement,
Empowerment, and Respect for Diversity, has pioneered an expansion
of micro-social development all over the world. Duer's program designs
and implements important norm-generating activities that have practical
benefits in providing development assistance from the bottom up
because the program seeks to advance community voice and promote
community engagement, gender empowerment, and a significant range
of other compelling components of empowerment and economic
development at the grassroots, micro-social level in civil society from
country context to country context. The success of these initiatives
underscores the theoretical importance of understanding the process of
functional law-making in the context of face-to-face encounters, brief
and fleeting connectivity, expanded interactive networks of kinship or
community structures, the larger global process of living, and dynamic
and challenging law-making for the improvement of the human
prospect.1
57
157. Specifically, Duer's Program for New Bank Practices in Civic Engagement,
Empowerment, and Respect for Diversity (CEERD) seeks sustainable, interactive avenues for
poverty-stricken populations to promote the give-and-take of informed dialogue, encourage civic
engagement, enhance governmental transparency, and access information. Program activities are
designed to encourage community voice and empowerment, and thus foster community debate on
critical issues, facilitate access to government meetings and events, and help community members
to organize themselves to identify and benefit from development opportunities. In the context of
undertaking technical assistance activities to establish community radio broadcasting stations in
certain developing States, including Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria, the CEERD Program tailors a
two-part development strategy to the cultural, geographical, and economic contexts within each
developing State. The first prong of the approach is a comprehensive analysis of the enabling
environment for community radio in each developing State (generally, on a region-by-region
basis) and, if feasible, for the development of the broadcasting sector as a whole, including non-
profit community broadcasting, commercial broadcasting, and national/regional public service
broadcasting, by collaborating with renowned experts in the discipline to detail possible legal and
regulatory reforms. The second prong is the prototyping of how community radio programs can
help deliver community-driven development goals, such as strengthening community
empowerment and local government accountability, and then familiarizing project management
and World Bank staff with the practical implications of integrating support for community radio
in lending earmarked for community-driven development. See The World Bank Group, Civic
Engagement, Empowerment & Respect for Diversity (CEERD), www.worldbank.org/ceerd (last
visited Mar. 28, 2007); The World Bank, Participation and Civic Engagement: Social
Accountability and Public Voice Through Community Radio Programming, 76 SOC. DEV. NOTES
(Apr. 2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCEERD/Resources/RADIO
_sdn76.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007); The World Bank Institute, Civic Voice: Empowering the
Poor Through Community Radio, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCEERD/Resources/
RADIObrief.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007); World Bank CEERD External Advisory Committee,
Report of the Community Radio Working Group (June 12-13, 2003), available at
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It is often the case that when lawyers invoke the relevance of context
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCEERD/Resources/RADIOEACreport.pdf (last visited
Mar. 28, 2007); Bruce Girard & Jo van der Spek, The Potential for Community Radio in
Afghanistan: Report of a Fact-Finding Mission to Afghanistan, October 5-22, 2002, available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCEERD/Resources/RAD1Oafghanistan.pdf (last visited
Mar. 28, 2007). This form of bottom-up development might be traced back to the self-sustaining
process of development and community empowerment pioneered in the Peruvian hacienda of
Vicos in 1952 by Harold Lasswell, Paul Doughty, and Allan Holmberg. The Vicos experiment
involved limited but targeted interventions into a community of peasants whose agrarian
production had been expropriated by a patron in an absentee landlord system under which the
peasants were reduced to serfs. The experiment was an exercise in transferring a comprehensive
set of decision-making skills to the community on the ground. The transfer was guided by a
functional understanding of the interdependence of a complex, but comprehensive, understanding
of basic human rights. Lasswell, Doughty, and Holmberg gave the concept of human rights an
anthropomorphic gloss; the social process of the Vicosinos was descriptively organized around
social relations covering a functional view of the desired values in human rights. These human
rights values were restated in functional anthropomorphic terms, including power, wealth,
respect, health and well being, enlightenment, skill, rectitude, and aesthetics. This
conceptualization provided a framework within which interdependent decision-making
competencies were transferred with a concern for their contextual influence and importance with
regard to all values. The key insight of the Vicos project was that the transfer of decision-making
skills with regard to critical value-institutional problems was successful in having the Vicosinos
use those skills as empowerment, enlightenment, and wealth-generating tools for self determining
their own cultural ownership of individual and collective dignity. Equally important was the fact
that the self-conscious acquisition of decision-making skills widely diffused in the community
generated micro-social norms, expectations of authority about those norms, and a critical
controlling intention that gave efficacy to the living law of the Vicosinos. In short, the Vicosinos
would be able to generate an internal micro-social legal system to define and secure their
common interests, notwithstanding social and political forces allied to defeat and expropriate their
power of community and individual decision. See HAROLD D. LASSWELL, THE FUTURE OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE 95-120 (1963); Ronald D. Brunner, Context-Sensitive Monitoring and
Evaluation for the World Bank, 37 POL'Y SC. 103 (2004); Paul L. Doughty, Vicos: Success,
Rejection, and Rediscovery of a Classic Program, in APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY IN AMERICA 433
(Elizabeth M. Eddy & William L. Partridge eds., 2d ed. 1987); Allan R. Holmberg, The Role of
Power in Changing Values and Institutions of Vicos, in PEASANTS, POWER, AND APPLIED SOCIAL
CHANGE: VICOS AS A MODEL 33 (Henry F. Dobyns, Paul L. Doughty & Harold D. Lasswell eds.,
1971); see also HAROLD D. LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES, 34-57 (1971)
[hereinafter LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES]. The World Bank has also
undertaken micro-economic activities, including micro-enterprise finance, which offer limited
economic incentives for the grassroots development of norm-generating expectations regarding
enterprise creation in some of the world's poorest States. Indeed, the World Bank has
experimented to some extent with the anthropomorphic value of wealth to promote these
enterprisory developments from which, it has been envisioned, some degree of poverty reduction
might be achieved in certain contexts with potentially broader implications. See, e.g., Amit Dar &
Zafiris Tzannatos, Active Labor Market Programs: A Review of the Evidence from Evaluations
(Jan. 1999), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/206518/ALMP%20review%201999.pdf
(last visited Mar. 28, 2007); Erica Field, Entitled to Work: Informal Enterprise in Urban Peru,
DEV. OUTREACH (Mar. 2005), http://wwwl.worldbank.org/devoutreach/mar05/article.asp?
id=284; World Bank, Electricity, Productivity, and Empowerment in Char Montaz, PROMISING
APPROACHES TO ENGENDERING DEV. (Aug. 2002), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTGENDER/Resources/electricity.pdf.
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to their craft, they also are looking implicitly for help from social or
technical scientists or other experts to delineate aspects of a particular
context and thus define a problem that requires legal intervention. A
harder look at the prescribing function yields important insight into the
structure of micro-social relations. A theory might be crafted from such
an investigation, which does not simply account for law, but rather
designates law as a central element of social inquiry. In this sense, law
can also be the theoretical basis of societal inquiry, which is much akin
to longstanding efforts to view society as a foundational basis for
inquiries about law.1 58 Whether social or behavioral scientists believe
there is little they can learn from lawyers to improve the theoretical
understanding of human relations may be a difficult professional gap to
bridge. On the other hand, if we truly believe that disciplined foci for
inquiry from many disciplinary vantage points might yield important
insights for theory construction and further inquiry, then micro-law has
made interdisciplinary inquiry an important agent for broadening
existing knowledge about law and human relations.
The larger jurisprudential implication of this insight into micro-social
relations and law is that whether one is observing macro-law
(international law), conventional law (municipal law), the law of small
groups (kinship, affection, and friendship circles), or micro-law (the law
of brief human interaction), each human relationship contains the
functional criteria of micro-law. From the vantage of the disengaged
observer, all law is rooted in human relations at every level of human
association and experience. Law is most realistically found in the shared
subjectivities of individual human personas and in their interactions
with others. Humans are more accurately seen in this view as objects
rather than empowered participants in the prescription of law; it is a
158. Oliver Wendell Holmes recognized that even the traditional legal scholar must inform
himself or herself about various aspects of social intercourse in order to measure law and legal
institutions. See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) (pointing out that law is a tool to achieve
social ends and thus, comprehending law first requires an understanding of social conditions and
other disciplines of study: "For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man
of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics").
Similarly, Judge Richard Posner chronicled the decade-by-decade decline of law as an
"autonomous discipline." See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous
Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987). Posner argues that the days when law
was a subject within the sole purview of "persons trained in law and in nothing else" are no more,
and that for better or for worse, the social implications of law require substantially different
treatment by practitioners and lay-people than ever before. Id. at 762. For an alternate viewpoint,
see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 108 (2d ed.
1993) ("[E]ven in theory there is no simple correlation between a society and its law.").
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dangerous jurisprudential myth to identify the lawmaking process
exclusively with the State. This view is not only myopic; it is dangerous
because it na.Towly defines the universe of law-making so as to
marginalize civil society and operative human relations generally.
Law is more correctly understood as an intrinsic part of the process
dealing with the authoritative allocation of values that may or may not
be desired. Law trains its focal lens on the human agents involved in the
give-and-take of claiming, confirming these claims, and also resisting
some claims within social processes. A law that cannot survive the
claims-forming process is not effectively responsive to human needs; in
many cases, this brief litmus test is sufficient to diagnose a law that
abuses human rights. Ultimately, what we call "law" is little more than a
response to human problems. Micro-social situations comprise the
fundamental stage for all segments of humanity where normative
experience is contested, rejected, accepted, and finally honed.
Understanding this allows us to see the professional relevance of micro-
law to broader legal theory, and also the relevance of micro-legal theory
to the jurisprudential foundations of human rights. Indeed, how human
beings treat each other on a face-to-face basis is, in reality, a normative
claim beyond the basic conventions of human rights; its objectives are
an even deeper and ubiquitous claim for essential and genuinely
universal human dignity. 
159
D. Additional Philosophical Considerations: Fresh Remarks on the
Implications of Micro-Law
Micro-law also raises an interesting and serious question for political
philosophy, constitutional law, and jurisprudence: If micro-social
159. That Harold Lasswell meticulously created the notional foundation of micro-law reflects
the New Haven School's fundamental acceptance of the primacy of human dignity-both in brief
encounters and at the global level-which it currently regards as a high level abstraction; the
School thus strongly desires to instigate a shift to a more specific approach to global respect for
human dignity in international law. See Eisuke Suzuki, The New Haven School of International
Law: An Invitation to a Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, 1 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 36-
37 (1974). Professor Lasswell wrote, "A suggestive aid in moving from [human dignity, which is
a] high-level abstraction toward specification is afforded by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which outlines some of the implications of human dignity." LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF
POLICY SCIENCES, supra note 157, at 42. There is an interesting parallel in Lasswell's western-
oriented approach and the concept of ubuntu in African law. The ubuntu principle is the juridical
foundation of African law and African society and translates to mean, "People are people through
other people." See George N. Barrie, Ubuntu Ungamntu Ngabanye Abantu: The Recognition of
Minority Rights in the South African Constitution, 2 TYDSKRIF VIR DtE SUID-AFRIKAANSE REG
(J. S. AFR. L.) 271, 271 (2000). In other words, humanity emerges in reciprocal interaction and
relationships with other humans; law in this view is human-centered and anthropomorphic.
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relations are the real repositories of law, then there is little in social
coexistence that is not law. One is reminded of Grant Gilmore's
stunning conclusion to his Storrs lectures at Yale in the 1970s that the
more law that exists, the less just a society would be; the less law there
is, the more just that society might be. 160 He then concluded that "in
Hell there will be nothing but law, and that due process will be
meticulously observed.' 16 1 Gilmore also asserted that "we will do well
to be on our guard against all-purpose theoretical solutions to our
problems."'162 Gilmore, a great commercial lawyer, would have
doubtlessly been aware of the living law role that merchants have
played in the development of commercial law rules. The State is, in
most respects, an after-the-fact player in the history of commercial law
and practice. Indeed, the role of the American Law Institute (ALl) in the
development of the Uniform Commercial Code is itself an indicator of
the crucial role of a non-State actor in the law-making process.
Curiously, Gilmore seems to have suggested that what is not covered by
the State as law is left to social anarchy. Indeed, Gilmore apparently
made the hasty assumption that for the living law to be actual law, it
must be under the majesty of the sovereign State. In Gilmore's view,
there is no role for civil society as a discrete, law-making and law-
applying repository of social value. So, is micro-law really promoting a
Gilmorian kind of due process shaped "hell" on earth? We think not.
However, Gilmore's point must be more carefully appraised against the
theory of micro-law as the starting point of communications theory,
with particular regard to the paramount importance of international
human rights. Such an analysis must carefully avoid Gilmore's trap of
succumbing to jurisprudential myopia. To summarize, Gilmore's clever
and verbally felicitous formulation rests on the well-known dualism
between the State and the individual-a concept to which we earlier
referred. Recall, however, Lasswell's suggestion that instead of a rigid
divide between these two zones, a connective continuum exists, which
binds the self and non-self. The regime of micro-law rejects rigid
hierarchical versions of law, and in so doing, changes the popular
understanding of the word "law" itself. Effective law, which exists both
formally and informally, is created by and functions from multiple
trajectories of communication. There is a world of difference between
160. See Grant Gilmore, The Storrs Lectures: The Age of Anxiety, 84 YALE L.J. 1022, 1044
(1975).
161. Id.
162. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 109 (1977).
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the way Gilmore used the word "law," and the way in which it figures
into micro-law. Authoritative commentators must choose which version
is more scientifically descriptive and normatively satisfying.
Chief among the critical jurisprudential insights into human rights
law presented by micro-law is the notion that power may be abused on
all levels of human intercourse, which effectively disparages the
essential dignity of the individual. Without some form of tacit or
institutionalized restraints, the abuses of power can be real and
damaging to those who are on the receiving end of its abuse. Although
the importance of international law in general would seem to be far
removed from micro-law because of the diametrically opposite scope of
each approach, in reality, a significant link exists between them, which
deeply strengthens the position and long-term protection of the
individual in the global legal arena. Perhaps Lasswell's deepest insight
is that legal and moral experiences are deeply rooted in the business of
simply being human.
V. TOWARD CONFRONTING THE ULTIMATE CHALLENGE: ARE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
BETTER UNDERSTOOD AND JUSTIFIED AS PROCESSES OF
COMMUNICATION AND COLLABORATION FOR WORLD ORDER
PURPOSES?
The importance of language in a multi-lingual world places unusual
stress on determining what international law is and how exactly it is
applied and enforced. It is thus crucial that international law be
understood for its multi-cultural, multi-language implications.1 63 It is
commonly assumed that legal language, with its distinctive and internal
structure of meaning, will often represent misunderstandings or self-
serving constructions with significant consequences for the major public
policy issues of our time.1 64 It is for this reason that we submit a broader
concept of communications theory based on functional conceptions
about how law is made, applied, and enforced across State and national
lines may facilitate our understanding and grounding of human rights
law as an important part of a defensible world order.
During his tenure as Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali organized the UN Congress on Public
163. See HOLLAND, supra note 36, at 373 ("[States are] [t]he Persons known to International
law.").
164. See, e.g., FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS! (1939).
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International Law. The general theme of the Congress was "Towards
the Twenty-first Century: International Law as a Language for
International Relations." 165 Boutros-Ghali saw in the language of
international law a certain coherence that was somewhat lacking in the
general language of international diplomacy and international relations.
The central point of Boutros-Ghali's intervention is that words carry
messages; if these messages are misunderstood or distorted, the
implications for international public order can be far reaching.
Constructively, language is capable of generating interpretative stability
within the legal profession that is beyond dispute. Indeed, "'jus cogens'
mean[s] 'the compelling law' and, as such, ajus cogens principle holds
the highest position in the hierarchy of all other norms, rules, and
principles."
' 166
However, thoughtful observers of international politics are certainly
aware that the vocabulary of international law is not without ambiguity.
Yet, despite the limitations of language in international law circles, they
are less significant when contrasted with the exuberance of the language
characteristics of world politics and international relations. Boutros-
Ghali suggested that "there is an international scientific community that
desires to establish international law as the language of international
relations."' 67 International law does not, of course, have an exclusive
internal set of official languages within the discipline. But it does have
conventions and professional understandings, and thus appropriates
language to advance particular purposes. This appropriation has become
165. American Society of International Law, Report of ASIL Program: Congress on Public
International Law, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. NEWSL. (Mar. 1994) (stating that the Program was
designed to allow participants to "exchange views on the codification, progressive development
and implementation of public international law as well as on its teaching and dissemination"); see
also THE UNITED NATIONS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A LANGUAGE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
xii (1996) (documenting the events of the United Nations Congress on Public International Law
held in New York on March 13-17, 1995).
166. M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to "General Principles of International
Law," 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 768, 801 (1989) (explaining that clear acceptance by the world
community demonstrates non-derogable peremptory norms, or jus cogens principles, in
international law).
167. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Foreword to THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 165, at xiv; see
also McDougal & Reisman, The Prescribing Function: How International Law Is Made, 6 YALE
STUD. IN WORLD PUB. ORD. 249 (1980), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY: CASES AND MATERIALS 84
(Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1981) ("The peoples of the world [use
international law to] communicate to each other expectations about policy, authority, and control
... through state [and] intergovernmental organs, [and] through reciprocal claims and mutual
tolerances in all their interactions.").
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quite comprehensive. The use of language in international law is
accompanied by discrete intrinsic understandings, and employs signs
and symbols of communication within an institutional framework in a
global effort to express stable and well-understood messages. These
messages contain certain understood expectations, which require some
precision in content as well as implicit or explicit references to symbols
of authority and efficacy. Although international law is not technically a
language in its own right,1 68 international law obviously has features
characteristic of language. In a sense, the "language" of international
law represents a coherent code of important communications.
According to Professor James Boyd White:
The language that the lawyer uses and remakes is a language of
meaning in the fullest sense. It is a language in which our
perceptions of the natural universe are constructed and related, in
which our values and motives are defined, and in which our
methods of reasoning are elaborated and enacted. By defining
roles and actors, and by establishing expectations as to the
propriety of speech and conduct, it gives us the terms for
constructing a social universe. 169
Indeed, the study of international law is arguably analogous to
linguistics in a number of ways. Like language, international law might
be studied synchronically, diachronically, and comparatively.
Functionally, neither are static mechanisms of communication; both are
subject to certain interpretations and limitations; each enjoys a
multitude of authoritative sources; and both exist in a "continuum of
complexity," with structural rules that range from fluid to rigid.1 70 We
submit that, essentially, international law comprises its own forms of
syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. In basic terms, the characteristics of
language in international law indicate a process of collaborative
communication. It has been argued by followers of Rawls that the
formation of international law is in part predicated on shared rules of
practice, and its application is thus subject to the constructions of the
168. But see Dino Kritsiotis, The Power of International Law as Language, 34 CAL. W. L.
REV. 397, 407 (1998) (stating that "international law is referred to as something of a 'new' lingua
gentium for state interaction and dialogue, even though its origins may be traced back to the year
of 1648 and the Peace Settlement of Westphalia").
169. James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and
Communal Life, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 692 (1985).
170. See MORTEZA MAHMOUDIAN, MODERN THEORIES OF LANGUAGE: THE EMPIRICAL
CHALLENGE 38-40 (1993).
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authoritative interpreter.' 7' Communications theory makes a near-
identical pronouncement with regard to micro-law.'
72
International law has developed important methods of interpretation
for its prescription and application. The construction and interpretation
of customary international law is accompanied by signs and symbols
that indicate comprehension and largely broad acceptance on the part of
the international community. Comprehensive epistemological studies
have been made of how it has been and is used in socio-political
contexts, and how such use effects its interlocutors by manipulating
State behavior.' 
73
The international law language (as it were) is highly stylized. It
encompasses styles of argument and of linguistic expression. A 1999
Symposium on Method in International Law organized by the editors of
171. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 80-86
(1999).
172. See Reisman, supra note 126, at 419 ("It is appropriate to refer to...microsystems as
legal systems because, for all of their informality, there is a rule and an attendant set of
expectations about proper subjective and objective responses to norm violation, intimating some
sort of system for enforcing the norm."); see also COMMUNICATION AND LANGUAGE: NETWORKS
OF THOUGHT AND ACTION 16 (Gerald R. Barry et al. eds., 1965) (remarking on the social,
collaborative aspects of communications theory); Myres S. McDougal, Some Basic Theoretical
Concepts About International Law: A Policy-Oriented Framework of Inquiry, in 2 THE
STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER: INTERNATIONAL LAW 116, 129 (Richard A. Falk & Saul H.
Mendlovitz eds., 1966).
173. See, e.g., Jutta Brunee, COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under Multilateral
Environmental Agreements, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1, 34 (2002) (suggesting that international law
is created by assessing patterns of international practices that create certain expectations over
time, which, in turn, are broadly comprehended by the international community); Reisman,
International Lawmaking, supra note 74, at 111, 114 (exploring the signs and symbols of
international law which, like language, indicate widespread comprehension of its general
authority and acceptance of the subject matter it communicates). For recent treatments of how
international law is interpreted, applied, and how it affects State behavior, see, for example, C. F.
AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
(2d ed. 2005); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2005); IAN CLARK, LEGITIMACY
IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2005); EXPANDING THE HORIZONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: NEW
AUTHORS, NEW THEMES (Ineta Ziemele ed., 2005); 4 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE QUEST
FOR JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS (Roger Brownsword ed., 2004); OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD
HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (2005); IMPERIALISM AND
INTERNATIONALISM IN THE DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (David Long & Brian C.
Schmidt eds., 2005); CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
RULES FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2005); and JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS?
WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (2005); see also HELENA
TORROJA MATEU, LA ASISTENCIA HUMANITARIA EN LA ORGANIZACION DE LAS NACIONES
UNIDAS: FUNDAMENTOS Y PERSPECTIVAS ACTUALES (2004); JANNE ELISABETH NIJMAN, THE
CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY AND
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004); SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE PERPLEXITIES OF MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS,
THEORY (2004); C.G. WEERAMANTRY, UNIVERSALISING INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004).
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the American Journal of International Law sought to "establish a firm
relationship between that language and the world that it is assumed to
reflect."' 74 Professor Martti Koskenniemi, a participant in this
symposium, expounded on his analysis of international law as a
language:
I described international law as a language that was constructed
of binary oppositions that represented possible-but
contradictory-responses to any international legal problem. I
then reduced international legal argument-what it was possible
to produce as professionally respectable discourse in the field-
to a limited number of "deep-structural" binary oppositions and
transformational rules. To this matrix I added a "deconstructive"
technique that enabled me to demonstrate that the apparently
dominant term in each binary opposition in fact depended on the
secondary term for its meaning or force. In this way, an
otherwise static model was transformed into a dynamic
explanation as to how the binary structures of international law
(rule/exception, general/particular, right/duty, formalism/realism,
sovereignty/community, freedom/constraint, etc.) were
interminably constructed and deconstructed in the course of any
argument, through predictable and highly formal argumentative
patterns, allowing any substantive outcome. I felt I had reached a
scientific optimum where I had been able to reduce a complex
(linguistic) reality into a limited set of argumentative rules.' 75
What Koskenniemi describes as a "'deep-structural' binary of
oppositions and transformational rules" seems a bit convoluted and
pretentious. In terms of general jurisprudence, Hohfeld, who first
introduced a kind of ordinary language analysis to legal communication,
demonstrated that when the term, "right," is unpacked, it yields a
number of jural opposites and jural correlatives.' 76 In short, the
foundational words used in any legal paradigm are going to be relational
by necessity. In Hohfeldian terms, the conceptual existence of a "right"
is predicated on the assumption that there exists the jural opposite: the
"no right." The concept of a right also correlatively assumes the
174. Martti Koskenniemi, Symposium on Method in International Law: Letter to the Editors
of the Symposium, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 351, 359 (1999).
175. Id. at 355.
176. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: As APPLIED
IN JUDICIAL REASONING 48 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1946) (deconstructing the word "right" as
a way to generally communicate "freedom" as opposed to what is notionally and fundamentally
granted by constitutions and jurisprudence).
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existence of the concept of a duty owed, which is its jural correlative.
Put simply, all prescriptive communication in law exists in the form of
jural opposites or jural correlatives; legal and normative prescriptions
come in pairs of balanced complementarity.' 77
For example, the juridical complementary to the UN Charter's
principle of international jurisdictional concern is the principle of
exclusive jurisdiction or non-intervention, whereby each State reserves
its sovereign domain from all externality.1' 78 In the law of treaties, the
foundational principle is pacta sunt servanda.179 The complementary
principle is rebus sic stantibus. 80  More controversially, today in
international law there exists the continuing, perennial conflict between
rules which prohibit the use of force-the forbidding of acts of
aggression' 81-and those which permit the use of force-the
sanctioning of acts of self-defense.' 82 Also, rules that define the right to
protect the environment and ecosystem' 83 are complemented by rules
concerning the right to development; permanent sovereignty over
resources and political self-determination.' 84  These principles are
177. The war of words in modem analytical jurisprudence has worked on a crucial
distinction: Some forms of communication have an internal character and some have an external
character. Prescriptive statements of law in the form of rules are special because they come vested
with distinctive internal meanings for legal operators and their constituencies.
178. See Nagan & Hammer, supra note 16.
179. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 L.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (setting out the "good faith" requirement,
whereby all parties bound to international conventions must act in accordance with their
provisions in good faith).
180. See id. art. 62 (setting out the principle that a State party to a convention may be excused
from performing treaty obligations in the event of certain unanticipated changes of circumstance).
181. See U.N. Charter arts. 1, 53.
182. See id. art. 51.
183. See, e.g., United Nations Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar.
22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1516 (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988) (requiring State parties to protect the
ozone layer); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1144 U.N.T.S.
397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) (requiring the preservation of the marine environment);
United Nations Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 18
I.L.M. 1442 (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983) (requiring State parties to limit air pollution).
184. For sources of international law that support the self-determination and the territorial
integrity of States, see, for example, Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986); Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/9556 (May 1, 1974); Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082
(Oct. 24, 1970); and Charter of Paris for a New Europe, U.N. Doc. A/45/859 (Dec. 12, 1990),
reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 190 (1991). For arguments that support the existence of a right to
development, see Roland Y. Rich, The Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right, 23
VA. J. INT'L L. 287 (1983). For the opposite position, see Jack Donnelly, In Search of the
798 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ubiquitous. The rules defining common crimes are complemented by the
rules establishing appropriate defenses or excusing circumstances for
the defendant. In the field of private international law the traditional
rules such as lex loci contractus or lex loci delictus are complemented
by the rules that negate the lex loci, including the principles of
characterization, substance, and procedure (renvoi, depecage, public
policy, and more). 185 Stone reminds us that legal precepts in the form of
rules tend to come in pairs, which are challenging because "they often
hunt in veritable packs."' 86 This phenomenon mirrors a fundamental
aspect of language-the "meaning" versus "no meaning" paradigm. In
all forms of language, an individual communicative mechanism either
has a meaning or it is without meaning. This might be generally and
cross-disciplinarily referred to as primitive data-typing, based on the
duality of values: one and zero. Language and international law further
harmonize in that this binary character of communication is only the
beginning because both have far more outside meaning.
Words are a key source of reasoned elaboration. Lawyers are trained
to interpret, construe, and otherwise find rational meanings for words.
This puts significant social power in the hands of any interpreter of
words. In the American tradition, perhaps the greatest victory for this
view is Marbury v. Madison.187 In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall
found that the authority to interpret or construe the Constitution of the
United States is exclusively in the hands of American jurists, the
profession trained to tease reason from the signs and symbols in the
Constitution. This argument also established the principle of judicial
review and the idea of the supremacy of law, which implies reasoned
Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 473
(1985).
185. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (setting outjus cogens principles as supreme
peremptory norms that supersede even international treaties and custom); see also RAPHAEL
LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION-ANALYSIS OF
GOVERNMENT-PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79 (1944) (famously expanding the signs and
symbols of international law by coining the term, "genocide," from the Greek root, genos
(meaning "kind" or "race") and the Latin affix, -cide (meaning "to kill"), which, he wrote,
"signitfies] a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves");
McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 116, at 987 (exploring another crucial addition to the international
law as language discourse: "human dignity"); McDougal & Reisman, The Prescribing Function,
supra note 74, at 273, 275 (arguing that international law must be motivated by the primary
policy goal of global respect for and protection of "human dignity").
186. JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 254 (1964).
187. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (setting out the precept of judicial review of all
cases arising under the Constitution of the United States).
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elaboration of the critical "signs" and "symbols" reposing in the
Constitution. 
188
Conventional legal theory has thus made important contributions
using modem language analysis in the development of law. From a
world history standpoint, perhaps one of the greatest insights of the
early Western legal tradition was undoubtedly the one orchestrated by
St. Thomas Aquinas.' 89 The great saint insisted that law (natural law)
was a product of reason, which emanated from God. 190 Aquinas also
pointed out that law might be an apparatus of social virtue, particularly
in the promotion of truth. Human beings, he maintained, should
voluntarily communicate-perhaps by using law as well as language-
to focus and express inner good, and not to use these gifts to explore the
nature of God, which is beyond humanity's reach.191 This
communicative concept of law evolved in the fullness of time. The early
nineteenth century was an age of science, and the natural law
implications of interpreting the signs and symbols of law-conditioned
words confronted the hardheaded approach of science-based meaning.
God was no longer the nucleus of law. John Austin suggested that all
law emanated from a sovereign.' 92 Specifically, true law, from a
scientific standpoint, must be accompanied by certain signs and
symbols, which are the product of an identifiable source-a sovereign-
and this source communicates law using a command structure created to
guide a community. 193 Austin correctly predicted that individuals
subject to law must be able to identify which signs and symbols count
as law, as well as those that do not. This scientific objective served as
the basis for the positivist analytical or scientific school of
jurisprudence. Austin's groundbreaking linguistic approach to law 194
188. See id.
189. A useful biographical note on St. Thomas Aquinas is found in GEORGE C. CHRISTIE,
JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 86-89 (1973) (citing
excerpts from the SUMMA THEOLOGICA).
190. See 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Question 94, art. 6 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., 1948) ("[T]he natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be
blotted out from men's hearts."); see also RALPH MCINERNY, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 63-70
(1977) (exploring St. Thomas Aquinas' philosophy that natural law emanates from God).
191. See AQUINAS, supra note 190, Question 13, arts. 1, 2.
192. See AUSTIN, supra note 30.
193. See id. (exploring the "command theory law," where law is dictated by an uncommanded
commander).
194. See J.L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (J.O. Urmson & G.J. Warnock eds., 2d ed.
1970). Several of Austin's essays, such as The Meaning of a Word, id at 55-75, and Truth, id. at
117-33, are particularly compelling.
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was later supplemented by immense contributions from Hohfeld'95 and
the analytical philosophy embodied in Ludwig Wittgenstein's work at
Cambridge. 196
Jurisprudence within the analytical school became a war of words, as
jurists such as H.L.A. Hart demonstrated a common sense view of law
through the prism of ordinary language analysis. 197 The ordinary
language method explored in Hart's celebrated work was soon applied
to many other aspects of law such as the law of causation,198 the theory
of punishment, 199 as well as the problems in general of law and
morality.200 Broader controversies outside the confines of positivist
disputation pitted the analytical school against those who saw it as
imperative to broaden the moral basis of law,20' those who saw it as
critical to broaden the economic foundations of law, 20 2 those who
sought to free law from the parochial chauvinism of national
"sovereignty," and those who saw law as a quintessential inquiring
system. Within these broad parameters, vast conflicts and disputes arose
concerning the role of words in law, the scope of interpretative versus
non-interpretative decision-making, the role of moral experience or
social change in law, and the role of gender, race, and basic human
195. See HOHFELD, supra note 181.
196. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 1953) (providing an excellent representation of Austin's ideas regarding ordinary language
philosophy).
197. See HART, supra note 25, at 89-96.
198. A critical element of Hart's version of analytical jurisprudence was to uncover the
ordinary language-the precise conventional form of language-that is used by lawyers. Hart's
model of rules has broad significance for communications theory. He defined law as a complex
system of rules, and identified-for the purposes of constructing a defensible analytical model of
law-a concept of law as defined uniting rules with primary and secondary characteristics. One of
the most important insights in Hart's work was his identification of primary rules, which seem to
have the characteristics of customary law. Modem jurisprudence would see such law as a kind of
lex imperfecta. The importance of Hart's insight was that he recognized that rules created by
custom have some form of efficacy. The implication is that social organization is governed by
rules, whether or not any codification exists. Hart's additional critical insight into the nature of
rules in law and social organization is that when rules function outside the framework of the
State, or without the specific midwifery of a secondary rule of recognition, some element of law
in social relations must nevertheless be conceded, albeit abstractly. See H.L.A. HART & A. M.
HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959).
199. See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1968) (examining the necessity and principles of justification for
punishment using a common language approach).
200. See generally H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963) (using common
language to argue against the legal regulation of morality).
201. See Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986
(1966).
202. See Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757 (1975).
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rights in the calculus of law.
In this context, micro-law might seem quixotic. If this is true, then
the human rights roots in micro-legal systems might be similarly
quixotic. However, when we contrast this with analytical jurisprudence,
the focus of this approach requires that we pinpoint and study practical
contexts where law is made and applied. The science of model building,
which is somewhat intolerant of the newer science of complexity,
requires that law, as a rigorous and analytical discipline, be employed as
a tool to examine and provide for the finest of details. This might
explain why some believe that conventional legal theory may actually
be subversive of human rights law. Human rights law requires law-
makers and law-appliers to see more; they must transcend the functional
and theoretical boundaries of the State. If we as thoughtful observers
step back for a moment, we might discover that this failure to transcend
the veritable ocean of contextual details associated with making and
applying human rights rules comprises an enormous failure of human
values, to say nothing of breaching conventional duties that require the
vast majority of the world to safeguard global human dignity. Indeed,
human rights legal culture has been sacrificed for too long. Words are
not an end in and of themselves. Declaring that human rights are
important and taking actual action are not the same. Austin
demonstrated that ordinary language was rich in complexity and insight;
micro-law demonstrates that ordinary non-verbal behaviors, too, are rich
in complexity and insight into the experience of being human. We
contend that a primary lesson must be to use this sensitivity to human
experience to better demonstrate the absolute import of human rights.
Employing international law as a means to engage in this continuing
discourse is the best way to achieve this superlative principle.
International lawyers are the primary participants in these continuing
discourses, employing the ostensible language of international law in
their central functions within the "(local to global) global law
paradigm." 20 3 International lawyers do more than merely work within or
clarify the sources of international law; they mold the signs, symbols,
and channels of communication of practical international law.
204
203. Nagan, supra note 36, at 149; see also id. at 142 ("The [international] lawyers roles are
emerging in some degree as part of a shift from the Westphalian (sovereignty dominated) model
of international law to a much more fluid context in which many actors influence the system in
addition to the State.").
204. See Doreen McBarnet, Law, Policy, and Legal Avoidance: Can Law Effectively
Implement Egalitarian Policies?, 15 J.L. & SOC'Y 113, 118 (1988) ("[International] [l]awyers are
not simply means to the implementation of statutory or other ready-made rights, but creators of
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Operationally, international lawyers create international law, which
generates expectations that are simultaneously transformative and
stabilizing components of world order. They are the makers of the
language, as it were.
Conventional international law dictates that professionalism and
functionalism value language as the primary mechanism of
communication. From the perspective of the New Haven School,
language might mask certain important components of what counts as
law because it arguably provides an effective cover by which the
exercise of naked power is disguised by a myth system of authority, and
power and control are thus open to abuse.2 °5 This means that much more
is required to appropriately understand the communications process,
which underlies the global public order system to ensure that its
untenable myths are challenged; myths that are productive or useful for
human understanding might thus be similarly promoted. Were it
conceded that international law functions analogously to language, it
would be crucial to point out that it is incomplete-which is in part due
to its lens of inquiry-which tends to obscure more than it reveals. The
international legal process still carries the freight of its Eurocentric
underpinnings; omnipresent political and cultural dominance at times
provokes confrontation, misunderstanding, and a depreciation of the
most productive role for the international legal system in the major
issues of our time. Chief among these issues is the status of human
rights.
Perhaps the most egregious fallout from inconsistencies between
international law and actual practice has been a wavering legal
infrastructure resulting in flexible human rights standards among the
legal techniques, definitions, and devices."); White, supra note 169, at 690 ("[I]n speaking the
language of the law, the lawyer must always be ready to try to change it: to add or to drop a
distinction, to admit a new voice, to claim a new source of authority, and so on.").
205. Having looked at language in particular as an important channel of communication in
both international law and custom, we must enter a small caveat about the limits of language apart
from the problems of ambiguity, incompleteness of meaning, logical circularity, and the
challenges of prescriptive complementarity. This lies in the concept of using language to create a
myth system, which may often be incompatible with the operational code of a society. The most
obvious example of such abuse in international law reposes in the word, "sovereignty." The term
reflects the principle that law includes the notion of constituted authority and control. Often,
sovereignty is used as an instrument of governmental abuse and repression. Under the theory of
sovereignty, Hitler's regime organized global aggression and the holocaust. Under the theory of
Soviet sovereignty, Joseph Stalin orchestrated a mass murder of people within the Soviet Union
spanning decades. See generally Nagan & Hammer, supra note 16 (examining the evolutive
concept of sovereignty in terms of effective political power, the nature of law, and political
culture in the twin contexts of international law and international relations).
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international community. This atmosphere of compromise has no place
in the ongoing international human rights discourse. It demonstrates the
necessity for increased attention to the language of international law as
a mechanism to better support these crucial principles and do away with
destructive myth systems, which permit regimes around the world to
formulate their own rules. The international law "language" must do
more in practice to communicate the value of individual rights. The
broader lens of communications inquiry may therefore serve the
important function of broadening the framework of operative words,
signs, and symbols that are a part of the foundational give-and-take of
human interaction, which generate norms and practices, in which purer
foundations of what ultimately counts as human rights law might
eventually be rooted.
VI. CONCLUSION
Humanitarian law and human rights law consistently resurrect the
problem that the individual has almost no identity in the international
legal system. This is because the individual is not widely viewed as a
subject of international legal order and therefore has limited, if any,
rights and duties which derive from the international legal system
without the consent of the sovereign State. Multiple versions of the
same general jurisprudential assumption exist, which are largely
influenced by the legacy of Austinian jurisprudence. This dominant
statist paradigm of international law only begrudgingly admits that the
individual has a legal identity in international law for the purpose of
protecting individual human rights. From this vantage, human rights are
not actually rights, but rather demonstrations of sovereign beneficence.
But we believe that the State, however important, is not an artifact of
absolutism sanctified by unreflective legal theory. We thus re-examined
how those who have been influenced by the scientific and behavioral
revolution in the social sciences, chief among them Harold Lasswell,
have approached the nature of the State, the community, and the
individual.
As we indicated above, Lasswell viewed the State in radically
phenomenological terms, which stemmed from his deconstruction of
propaganda and subsequent precocious development of the framework
for modem communications theory and research. Our examination of
communications theory in light of both macro-law and micro-law, as
well as through the lens of diverse theories concerning law, society, and
science, has demonstrated that it is a useful tool for understanding how
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human perspectives and subjectivities are deeply implicated in the
generation of rules that have both normative and moral salience. A
primary ideological implication of this point of view is that our starting
point of analysis is not grounded in an abstraction called the State, and it
does not solely vindicate the values and morals of the dominant class or
group.
By observing the State through the lens of communication, we begin
to see the complex trajectories of human interaction behind both the
State and the international community. We might functionally examine
law from the micro- to macro-levels of human communication, which
yields valuable lessons about interpersonal and individual-State
interconnectivity. Implicit in this approach is a general acceptance of
the human or anthropomorphic foundations of law, which have large-
scale interpretational implications for modern jurisprudence and human
rights. Since the very existence of law is contingent on the existence of
human interlocutors, it is impossible to divorce the significance of
human experience from the law. Even positivist approaches to law,
which champion the authority of the State, cannot explain away the
significance of the individual in the processes of law-creation. This
suggests that any jurisprudence that ostensibly seeks to purge itself of
the human agents of decision might be dangerous from a normative
standpoint. This approach to law thus suggests that inquiries into law be
rooted in human experience; we must use communications theory to
understand how human rights perspectives are formed, affirmed,
depreciated, or destroyed.
Accordingly, Lasswell's breakthrough recognition that micro-social
communication might count as law offered the key to unlocking large
world order problems. In short, moral understandings, prescriptive
experience, and awareness of rudiments of authority and control are
visible at every level of social interaction. By extension, when the State
legislates or otherwise executes a matter of public importance, this
process might actually reflect the final iterative steps of a more complex
and dynamic framework of conflict and collaboration to ensure the
foundations of decency and to constrain the impulse to abuse. If our
description and analysis is correct, then one of the core problems of the
jurisprudence of human rights is effectively solved-individuals are
indeed the ultimate unit of legal description and analysis and the
emergence of the artifact known as the State cannot simply wrest law-
creation away from its human foundations. Micro-law humanizes the
ideas of justice, respect, empathy, and dignity; it advances the notion
that human beings are the generators of norms that demarcate good and
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evil. Not only are we the source of our values, we are the judges of the
extent to which we identify with them, value them, and how committed
we are to promoting and defending them. The micro-law foundations of
human rights therefore provide a mandatory but lonely walk for all
human rights-sensitive individuals. It underscores just how important
human rights is to the deep underlying structures of freedom and justice,
and how threatened human rights might actually be in a global system
that does not adequately theoretically describe and justify them, and
thus cannot truly understand them.
* * *
